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Is every statement in or about the law a story? Is every ex-
planation of the law a narrative? Is all legal argumentation rhe-
torical? Maybe, but maybe not. Surely the answer depends on
what is meant by the terms "story," "narrative," and "rhetorical."
In this article, we argue that terms such as these, and claims
that rely on them, require definition and clarification. Questions
such as "is law narrative?" or "is law rhetorical?" implicate the
tricky business of how meaning is made in law. If that is the is-
sue, we ought to face it directly. That is the aim of this essay.
Law is a communicative activity. Clients communicate to
lawyers; witnesses communicate to courts; lawyers communicate
to each other, to judges, and to juries; judges communicate to
lawyers and parties; legal scholars communicate to each other
and, sometimes, to the practicing bar. This list could easily be
expanded.
Some of the communicative activity involved in law takes a
form that most people would recognize as storytelling. Wit-
nesses' accounts of events, for example, or clients' explanations
of their legal problems are often perceived in this way. Thus,
someone observing a trial might describe a witness's testimony
along the following lines: "He told his story about the accident,
that he was going to the store and saw the defendant run the
light and hit the plaintiff." A lawyer might describe her first
meeting with a client this way: "She told me her story of how
her husband started to drink heavily, so the marriage failed and
she wanted a divorce." The statements of the witness and the
client conform to ordinary, common sense notions of what a
story is. To say that law involves storytelling in this sense is not
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terribly controversial.1
Many other communications within law can also be under-
stood as stories. Judicial opinions select from among the many
facts adduced at trial those -relevant" to what is deemed to be
the case's issue to construct a statement of the case; the result-
ing rendition of "the facts" can thus be seen as a story crafted to
support the court's holding.2 Were the issue framed differently,
or were the court to reach a different result, different facts
might be selected, and another story told.3
Legal doctrine itself may be seen as a set of stories. The
substantive law of contracts, for example, may be perceived as
telling a story of free will and free choice.4 Or the substantive
law of rape may be understood as telling a story about how men
and women communicate (dis)interest in sex.5 The justifications
1. This is not to say that legal forms do not constrain in important ways precisely
what can be communicated. Rules of evidence, the procedural structure of trials, and the
expectations of legal actors such as judges and attorneys all may be at odds with the or-
dinary speech practices of litigants and witnesses, and thus might limit or alter what is
or can be said in legal settings. For an overview of this phenomenon, see JOHN M. CON.
LEY & WIuAM Mt O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DIS-
COURSE (1990).
2. For an analysis of the language of judicial opinions, see RICHARD POSNER, LAW
AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATIONSHIP 269 (1988); Sanford Levinson, The
Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAws STORuES: NARRATvE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW
187 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) [hereinafter LAw's STORIES]. See also Paul
Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAw's STORIES, supra, at 11 ("judicial
opinions always create 'the facts' in the sense that judges always select out from the pro-
fusion of details before them selected particulars that seem plausible and give an ac-
count coherence.").
3. On the importance of the framing of the issue, see Robert A. Ferguson, The Judi-
cial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 208 (1990) ('The real creativ-
ity in a judicial decision lies in the question that judges decide to accept as the basis of
their deliberations. This question and its competitors are peculiar as well as central to
the judicial opinion .... Every court makes a fundamental decision about the question
before it, and the wording in that first decision controls all others."); Kim Lane Schep-
pele, Foreword Telling Stories, 87 Micm L. REv. 2073, 2094 (1989) [hereinafter Schep-
pele, Foreword] ("[1]n legal stories, 'where one begins' has a substantial effect because it
influences just how the story pulls in the direction of a legal outcome.").
We do not mean to suggest that facts are immaterial to the framing of the issue.
Rather, the process is dynamic: an overview of the facts will suggest some legal catego-
ries and, possibly, rule out others; the legal categories then trigger a search for specific
facts related to them; the final choice of category renders certain facts relevant and
others irrelevant. See KIM LANE ScHmPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 95 (1988) (describing this
process).
4. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE LJ.
997, 999-1000 (1985). In these and the examples that follow, we recount one story that
doctrine might be said to tell. As we explain below, other stories might also be told of
the same doctrines.
5. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986). The "official story" of rape unfor-
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for the formalities of wills law might be said to involve a story
about the potential for carelessness and greed in the setting of
donative transfers.6 Any given set of doctrinal rules might be
said to dictate what stories may emerge and how they may
emerge in potential cases involving those rules; the substantive
law determines which facts will and which will not be deemed to
bear on the problem at hand.
7
While the notion that a witness's or a client's account is a
story-or even "just" a story-tends not to raise too many eye-
brows, the notion that opinions are (just) stories, or that all law
is (just) a story excites more controversy. Some of this contro-
versy may be the result of the vehemence or lack of modulation
of some of the claims legal scholars have made.8 The stronger
the argument that law is only or merely a story, the more fre-
quent the reminder that law is not literature,9 and that "legal
interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death."10
But some of the controversy is different. Consider, for exam-
ple, the following statement written recently by Judge Leval of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
tunately continues to focus more on sexuality and consent than on aggression.
6. Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155 (1989).
7. Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1574, 1591 (1987)
("Legal categories-whether created by doctrine, statute, or constitution-will define le-
gal discourse, will indicate what is 'relevant' and what is not); Joan C. Williams, Criti-
cal Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62
N.Y.U. L REv. 429, 495 (1987) ("[Tlhe purpose of legal doctrine is ... to create a consen-
sus about which issues are potentially relevant to [a dispute's] resolution. Doctrine...
describes the scope of the conversation....").
8. See, eg., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Final Chronicle: Cultural Power, The Law
Reviews, and the Attack on Narrative Jurisprudence, 68 S. CAl. L. REv. 545, 564 (1995)
("'Legal storytelling is potentially the most revolutionary form of scholarship on the cur-
rent scene .. . "'). See also Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self- Autobiographical
Performances in Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REv. 1229, 1247 (1995) (arguing that
"the scope and intensity of the political claims made on behalf of storytelling are them-
selves cause for wonder" and giving examples of such claims).
9. See, e-g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Life is Not a Dramatic Narrative, in LAw's STORIES,
supra note 2, at 99, 100-05 (arguing that the truth conventions of literature-in which,
for example, a gun introduced in Act I must be discharged by Act rI--distort reality and
therefore are inappropriate for law); Robin L. West, Adjudication is Not Interpretation:
Some Reservations About the Law-as-Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. Rsv. 203, 207
(1986) ("Despite a superficial resemblance to literary interpretation, adjudication is not
primarily an interpretive act... ; adjudication.., is an imperative act. If we lose sight
of the difference between literary interpretation and adjudication,. . . then we have ei-
ther misconceived the nature of interpretation, or the nature of law, or both.").
10. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). Of
course, literature too is filled with pain and death. But the field to which Cover refers is
that of the actual, not the imagined.
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The objectives and duties of the judicial opinion are far different from
those of polemics, poetry, and the narrative forms of ,literature; the em-
ployment of their rhetorical techniques of suggestion and evocation will
more likely be at the expense of, than in the service of, the opinion's ca-
pacity to achieve its goals. Pursuit of literary techniques is more likely to
undermine than to reinforce the success of the opinion in meeting its ju-
dicial obligations.'
Surely Judge Leval takes as part of the "judicial obligation"
that a judicial opinion must persuade its audience, if not of the
rightness of the decision it advocates, then of the reasoning
processes by which that decision was reached.12 Thus its deploy-
ment of "rhetorical techniques" is not "at the expense of," but ac-
tually "in the service of," its goals.13 Judicial opinions may or
may not employ lyrical images or poetic metaphors. Yet most
contain several narrative sequences: at the very least, they con-
tain stories of what happened among the parties and also of the
procedural status of the lawsuit. And from the perspective of
their persuasive intent, all judicial opinions might be character-
ized as polemics, if by that term is meant simply a learned dis-
putation aimed at resolving a controversy.
Judge Leval's statement illustrates one of the stickiest
problems in the debates concerning legal storytelling: the lack of
agreed-upon definitions for the vocabulary legal scholars have
11. Pierre N. Leval, Judicial Opinions as Literature, in LAw's SToRIEs, supra note 2,
at 206, 207.
12. Judge Leval states:
What are the essential tasks of the opinion? (1) To analyze the problem and its
solution clearly and logically and (2) to state the holding clearly, with clear ex-
planation (including recitation of pertinent facts) of the reasons supporting it.
The opinion is performative, and the performance of its task depends on clear
analysis and clear transmission of its message.
Id.
13. For a detailed discussion of how judges use rhetoric to advance the aims of their
opinions, see MARTHA NUSSBAUM, PoETIc JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC
LIMs 99-118 (1995). Nussbaum specifically praises the opinion of Judge Posner in Carr v.
General Motors (Allison Gas Turbine Division), 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994), in the fol-
lowing terms:
fIlmagination and appropriate emotion are crucial in the reasoning of [Pos-
ner's] opinion. His indignation is not capricious: it is solidly grounded in the
facts, and he can make his reader feel it in his narration of the facts. Indeed,
his opinion does what good satire of the Juvenalian or Swiftian kind does: it
inspires indignation through the mordant portrayal of human venality and cru-
elty. Here... the literary approach is closely connected with sympathetic at-
tention to the special plight of people who are socially unequal and to a certain
extent, therefore, helpless.
Id. at 110-11.
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drawn from the field of literary criticism. 14 While some theoreti-
cal terms-for example, "decostruction71-have been examined
with care, the basic literary critical vocabulary has been taken
to be self-evident. In particular, the words "story", "rhetoric",
and "narrative" are assumed to be of no lexical complexity and
are often used interchangeably.16
This undisciplined use of terms fosters confusion and exag-
geration in the claims-pro and con-made about the impor-
tance of storytelling in law. Storytelling is not an all-or-nothing
proposition. To say, as we did in the examples with which we
began, that law involves storytelling, or to say, as many legal
scholars have recently argued, that law should do more to take
account of the stories of outsiders, 17 is not to say that law is
only or simply an ever-changing set of stories. Unfortunately, it
has been easy for some to make that leap.18 Similarly, efforts to
explain how storytelling invokes and employs emotion in the
service of argument contribute to an erroneous dichotomization
of emotion from reason. 9 Reason as much as emotion controls
14. Ann Coughlin concurs:
A significant problem with much of the outsider narrative scholarship is that
its key terms, including "narrative," "story," "storytelling," "myth," and "experi-
ence," are not carefully defined, if they are defined at all, or the terms are used
so expansively that it is difficult to know what particular meaning the author
has in mind with any specific reference.
See Coughlin, supra note 8, at 1253 n.82. Unlike Coughlin, we do not believe this prob-
lem is confined to outsider narrative scholarship.
15. See generally J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE
LJ. 743 (1987).
16. See, e-g., Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CoRNEIL L.
REv. 813 (1992); Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. Rxv. 381 (1989).
Both Delgado and Ross use more or less synonymously the words "story," "narrative,"
"myth" and "rhetoric." Delgado, supra, at 818; Ross, supra, at 381-87. Sometimes the use
of "narrative" and "storytelling" as synonyms represents an explicit choice. See Susan
Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Cm. L. REV. 361, 363
n.8 (1996) ("I use the terms 'narrative' and 'storytelling' interchangeably.").
17. See, eg., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971
(1991); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Cli-
ent Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107 (1991); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists
and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 M&cIm L REv. 2411 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607 (1994); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
18. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri
Yurasov: Further Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. I, REv. 647, 658 (1994)
(suggesting that certain narrative scholarship embodying "a postmodern epistemology..
has the potential to endanger the viability of the rule of law").
19. See, e-g., Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. IJ. 453, 459 (1996) (ar-
guing that when radical constructivists turn to the narrative and emotional functions of
language "what people say becomes as important as what they can 'prove,' and the per-
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the domain of stories, because interpretation itself is a rational
process in which factors such as credibility, plausibility, coher-
ence, consistency, and so on determine conclusions, just as such
factors affect outcomes in the law.
Because vocabulary matters, it is important that we be
clear in our use of words. We propose to use the term "rhetoric"
to denote simply the art of persuasion.20 In this use, we follow
Aristotle:
Rhetoric is useful because things that are true and things that are
just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites .... [We
must be able to employ persuasion, just as deduction can be employed,
on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice em-
ploy it both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong),
but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if an-
other man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him.
No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric
alone do this.
21
suasiveness of any given claim rests as much on its noncognitive or emotional appeal as
on whether it accords with the dictates of reason and common knowledge."). See also
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Legal Storytelling and Constitutional Law: The Me-
dium and the Message, in LAW's STORIES, supra note 2, at 37, 50:
Whereas storytellers view language as operating most powerfully beyond the
realm of reason, many of those who oppose either the methodology or the sub-
stance of the storytellers' proposals celebrate the use of language as a tool of
rational argument.
Indeed, it should not be surprising that storytelling has been the object of
resistance in the legal academy. Both law and the academic world have long
been viewed as bastions of reasoned argument within a broader world that re-
lies less on reason and more on power or rhetoric...
This belief in the primacy of reason rather than rhetoric underlies much of
the resistance to both the message and the medium of storytelling. The few di-
rect critiques of storytelling that have been published so far have argued for
the primacy of reasoned argument in scholarship.
(footnote omitted).
For an argument that the reason/emotion dichotomy is misguided, see Dan M.
Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUm L. REv. 269 (1996).
20. We specifically do not mean to use the term rhetoric in the popular sense of
something "concerned primarily with style rather than substance, with persuasion
rather than discovery of the better argument, with emotion rather than reason, with
dazzling effect rather than rigorous analysis" J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The
Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in LAw's STORIES, supra note
2, at 211, 211.
21. AIsrOTLE, RHETORIc I.1.1355a22-35 in THE ComPLE WoRKs OF ARIsroTLE (rev.
Oxford trans. Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter CohiPLETE WORKs]. See also Stan-
ley Fish, Rhetoric, in CRmCAL TERMS FOR LrrERARY STUDY 203 (Frank Lentricchia &
Thomas McLaughlin eds., 2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter CRmcAL TEiss].
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In classical formulations, rhetoric was the discipline most
intrinsic to the practice of law, and "the substantive aspects of
rhetoric ...remain central to the contemporary work of law-
yers, judges, and students of the law."2 Rhetoric and substance
cannot be separated: "[W]hen we try to justify a particular rule
of law to another person, we must find arguments that justify it,
and to do this we ourselves must analyze the situation and de-
termine the most plausible arguments for and against the posi-
tion that we are taking. So the tasks of persuasion and analysis
go hand in hand!23
We use the term "story" to mean an account of an event or
set of events that unfolds over time and whose beginning, mid-
dle, and end are intended to resolve (or question the possibility
of resolving) the problem set in motion at the start.24 Not all
stories can be classified as "literary," for we take "literary" sto-
ries to be only those which are deliberately both artful and fic-
tive. Stories form one aspect of the larger category of "narra-
tive": stories are, in Seymour Chatman's words, "the what of
narrative,"2 to which other elements such as character, setting,
point of view, and so on, remain subservient.26
We use the term "narrative" to signify a broader enterprise
that encompasses the recounting (production) and receiving (re-
ception) of stories. This enterprise functions to organize certain
kinds of problems into a form that renders culturally meaning-
ful both the problems and their possible resolutions. For exam-
ple, Oedipus Rex 27 is comprised of many individual stories: of
the curse on Laius and Jocasta, of their binding Oedipus's feet
and leaving him on a hillside to die, of the shepherd who res-
cues him and took him to Corinth, of Oedipus's killing several
men at a crossroads (one of whom is, unbeknownst to him, his
father), of Oedipus's solving the riddle of the sphinx, of Oedi-
22. Balkin, supra note 20, at 212.
23. Id. at 215.
24. Stories that end ambiguously are not inconsistent with this definition, for ambi-
guity is a form of resolution.
Note that in many languages, the Romance languages and German in particular,
the same word denotes what English needs both "story" and "history" to signify
25. SEYmOUR CHATAN, STORY AND DISCOURSE: NARRATIvE STRucuE IN FICTION AND
Fu 9 (1978).
26. See generally PETER BROOKS, READING FOR THE PLOT- DESIGN AND INTENTION IN
NARRATIVE (1984).
27. There are many translations of Sophocles' best-known play. See, eg., Oedipus
The King, in 1 GREEK TRAGEDIES 107 (David Grene & Richmond Lattimore eds., 1960);
SOPHOCLES: THE OEDIPUs CYCLE (Dudley Fitts & Robert Fitzgerald trans., 1949); SOPHO-
CLES: THE THREE THEBAN PLAYS (Robert Fagles trans., 1982). The trilogy includes Oedi-
pus the King, Oedipus at Colonus, and Antigone.
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pus's marriage to his own mother. These stories are embedded
in a frame story in which Thebes is gripped by plague. Together,
these interwoven stories, concluding with Jocasta's suicide, Oed-
ipus's self-blinding and exile, and the end of the Theban plague,
comprise a narrative of the relation between transgression and
punishment.2 The narrative consists of the cumulative effects of
these separate stories as their aggregate meaning comes to
light. By organizing discrete stories and constructing their
"point," narrative is interactive and social; it represents one col-
lective way of knowing things, one communal mechanism for
grasping the world. As Peter Brooks has written, narrative is
"one of our large, all-pervasive ways of organizing and speaking
the world-the way we make sense of meanings that unfold in
and through time.
29
With these definitions in mind, we may be better able to see
why the law, broadly speaking, may be said to employ rhetorical
strategies, to use stories, and to be narrative. We may also see
why these suggestions-that law contains stories and can be cat-
egorized as narrative-have aroused such controversy. Some of
the controversy stems from the view that law cannot be reduced
entirely either to storytelling or to the broader category of nar-
rative. Of course not. Yet we need to understand the ways legal
discourse uses and embeds narrative elements.
Certainly judicial opinions, especially those parts that dis-
cuss the law as opposed to the facts of the case, seem less story-
like in form than the ordinary witness and client accounts de-
scribed above. But critiques such as Judge Leval's implicitly con-
cede that judicial opinions could be cast as narratives; if it were
not possible to apply to opinions the techniques of "the narrative
forms of literature," there would be no reason to be concerned
about the appropriateness of doing so. So notwithstanding their
apparent difference from witness and client accounts, opinions
28. Cultural meaningfulness is contingent; it shifts from one historical moment to
another, and from culture to culture. More than one culturally meaningful narrative
may operate simultaneously. For example, fifth century B.C.E. Greeks understood illness
to represent a punishment from the gods. If we were to list the variety of narratives
that purport to explain the global AIDS epidemic, for example, in the late twentieth cen-
tury, we would need to include, among others, beliefs in HIV (and retroviruses in gen-
eral) as a causal factor (a scientific narrative); Western ideas concerning the sexual prac-
tices of central Africans (a racialized narrative); and judgments that hold homosexual
practices to be unnatural and thus deserving of punishment (a moral narrative). Note
that this last narrative returns us, anachronistically, to Thebes.
29. Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW's STORIES, supra note
2, at 14, 14. See also J. Hillis Miller, Narrative, in CRmcAL TEms, supra note 21, at 66,
66.
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can be understood as narratives. Similarly, scholarly articles in
law reviews-even if they do not take the form of explicit narra-
tives-can also be seen to tell stories about what the law is or
could be. 30 The question is not whether opinions, articles, or
other communicative acts within law can be seen as stories, but
whether they are best understood in this way.
This is the question we address in this paper: Is it useful-
and, if so, in what ways is it useful-to focus on the narrative
qualities of various communications and interactions that occur
within the law? Not surprisingly (why else would we write?), we
believe that a focus on narrative in law can be helpful as a way
of elucidating how meaning is made in legal contexts. This is
not to say that all meaning, in or outside of law, is somehow in-
eluctably narrative in character.31 Rather, we assert that exam-
ining when it seems problematic or unproblematic to describe le-
gal communications as stories helps to illuminate how narrative
conventions regulate the production of meaning in legal con-
texts. Moreover, as we will demonstrate, debates about narra-
tive are connected to cultural anxieties about the status and
role of "facts" in law.
30. See Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. Ray. 255, 276 (1994). See
also Bandes, supra note 16, at 385 ("The legal discourse we observe, create, and partici-
pate in is already ordered into narratives. It is just that some are more visible than
others.").
31. One of us, it must be said, has asserted elsewhere: "It can be argued that all
human understanding is finally organized by and achieved through narrativity, that
narrative can be said to underpin all Western epistemologies." JULIA EPSTEIN, ALTERED
CONDrTONS: DISEASE, MEDICINE, AND STORYTrELUNG 25 (1995). For other arguments to this
effect, see ARTHUR DANTO, ANALYTIcAL PmLosoPHY OF HISrORY (1965); W.B. GALLIE, PHI-
LOSOPHY AND HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING (1964); Louis 0. Mink, Narrative Form as a
Cognitive Instrument, in THE WRITING OF HIsToRY: LITERARY FORM AND HISTORICAL UN-
DERSTANDING 129 (Robert Canary & Henry Kosicki eds., 1978); Paul Ricoeur, The Narra-
tive Function, in HsErENEurics AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 291 (John B. Thompson ed.,
1981).
Alan Dershowitz argues to the contrary that:
Life is not a purposive narrative .... Events are often simply meaningless, ir-
relevant to what comes next; events can be out of sequence, random, purely ac-
cidental, without purpose.... Human beings always try to impose order and
meaning on random chaos, both to understand and to control the forces that
determine their destiny. This desperate attempt to derive purpose from pur-
poselessness will often distort reality ....
Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 100. See also HAYDEN WHrIE, TnE CONTENT OF THE FORM:
NARRATIVE DISCOuRsE AND HISToRiCAL REPRESENTATION 24 (1987) ("[T]he value attached
to narrativity in the representation of real events arises out of a desire to have real
events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is
and can only be imaginary").
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In Part I we illustrate the narrative character of a tradi-
tional law review article. Our point is to show that it is rela-
tively simple to see even the most conventional scholarly writing
as containing and comprising a story. In Part II we examine
whether our analysis in Part I is "fair" to the article, or whether
it distorts in important ways what the article says. Our goal
here is to demonstrate the epistemological positions at stake in
the controversy over narrative. In Part III, we connect the de-
bates about storytelling to contemporary debates over the possi-
bility of neutrally or objectively discovering and representing
facts. These debates have a peculiar valence and poignancy in
law, where "finding the facts" has always seemed central to do-
ing justice.
I. ARTICLE AS STORY
Some communications seem more obviously to be stories
than others. Many would agree that "Cinderella" and "Little Red
Riding Hood" are stories. A friend's account of how she learned
to ride a bicycle or how a bear got into her backpack on a camp-
ing trip would also fit comfortably into most people's notion of a
story. We "recognize" these communications as stories without
conscious consideration, without having a specific definition of
"story" in mind, and without needing to classify these "stories"
as fairy tales, personal anecdotes, mythic quests, Greek trage-
dies, and so on.
Some communications do not seem to be stories. Few of us
would read a grocery shopping list to our children at bedtime.
Asked to "tell a story" around the campfire, most of us would
not read aloud the lead piece in the New England Journal of
Medicine or the section of Williston's treatise on contracts deal-
ing with, say, the definition of an "offer." However vague our
concept of a story might be, these writings do not seem to fit.
To say that some communications seem like stories and
some do not is not to posit a definitive type or genre. While the-
orists of history and of literature have worked to describe the
essential elements of a story or narrative,32 few people consult
32. See, eg., ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS: THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY IN WESTERN
LiTERATURE (Willard R. Trask trans., 1953); MnHAIL M. BAKaTI, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINA-
TION: FOUR ESSAYS (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans.,
1981); NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOiY OF CRITICISM: FoUR ESSAYS (1957); FREDRIC JAMESON,
THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY SYMOLIC ACT (1981); WALLACE
MARTIN, RECENT THEORIES OF NARRATIvE (1986); VLAD~mU PROPP, MORPHOLOGY OF THE
FOLKTALE (Louis A. Wagner ed. & Laurence Scott trans., 2d ed. 1968); PAUL RICOEUR,
TIME AND NARRATIVE (Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer trans., 1984); ROBERT
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such descriptions in characterizing what they hear or read as a
"story." Most of us rely instead on intuition or experience to sort
communications into categories such as "fairy tale," "anecdote,"
"list," "article," or "treatise."
Yet the lines that separate these categories are easily
blurred. For example, the notion of a sharp and distinct divide
between an "article" on the one hand and a "narrative" on the
other is undermined by the fact that even the most traditional
law review article may, and usually does, contain elements that
are associated with narrative. The kind of writing that we have
come to recognize as an article relies no less than any "story" on
formal and rhetorical devices; it tells a "story" about the law
under discussion; and it also tells a "story" about its author-if
only, in many articles, a story of invisibility. These points can be
illustrated by examining the famous law review article by Her-
bert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law.33 We choose this article not because we wish to join the
chorus of those praising or castigating Wechsler's thesis, but be-
cause its status as legal scholarship has never to our knowledge
been questioned. 34
A. The Ideology of Toward Neutral Principles
Wechsler's main thesis in Toward Neutral Principles con-
cerns the proper criteria of constitutional interpretation. 5 He
states them as follows:
SCHOLES & ROBERT KELLOGG, THE NATURE OF NARRATIVE (1966); TZVETAN TODOROV, THE
PoEMics OF PROSE (Richard Howard trans., 1977).
33. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1 (1959).
34. A 1985 survey listed Toward Neutral Principles as the second most heavily cited
law review article. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1540, 1549 tbl.1 (1985). When that survey was updated in 1996, Toward Neutral Princi-
ples remained the second most frequently cited law review article. Fred R. Shapiro, The
Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 766 thl. 1 (1996).
For a collection of sources demonstrating 'the extent to which [Toward Neutral Princi-
ples] continues to provoke controversy and attract citations," see Norman Silber & Geof-
frey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles' in the Law: Selections from the Oral History of
Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. Rv. 854, 855 n.6 (1993). For a recent critique of Toward
Neutral Principles, see NussBAuM, supra note 13, at 87-90.
35. A second thesis, comprising Part I of the article, concerns the scope of the Su-
preme Court's powers of review and, more specifically, the circumstances under which
the Court should abstain from adjudicating constitutional questions. Wechsler's reading
of the constitution's text led him to the conclusion that "the only proper judgment that
may lead to an abstention from decision is that the Constitution has committed the de-
termination of the issue to another agency of government than the courts." Wechsler,
supra note 33, at 9.
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I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial process is pre-
cisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every
step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite
transcending the immediate result that is achieved. To be sure, the
courts decide, or should decide, only the case they have before them. But
must they not decide on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality,
tested not only by the instant application but by others that the princi-
ples imply?
36
This thesis may or may not be an interesting or adequate
account of how to interpret the Constitution.3 7 Yet in developing
it, Wechsler relays a fascinating-though not entirely explicit-
narrative about the nature of judge-made law. In this narrative,
Wechsler's central concern is to underscore the legitimacy of ju-
dicial reasoning processes by proposing how judges can decide
cases in a value-free and truly impartial manner.
In Wechsler's narrative, the evil to be combatted is personi-
fied in those who "frankly or covertly make the test of virtue in
interpretation whether its result in the immediate decision
seems to hinder or advance the interests or the values they sup-
port."38 This result-oriented instrumentalism is fine for the polit-
ical arena,3 9 as well as for the legislative and executive branches
of government.40 But, in contrast to these institutions, courts
"are bound to function otherwise than as a naked power or-
gan."4' There is "a vital difference between legislative freedom to
appraise the gains and losses in projected measures and the
kind of principled appraisal, in respect of values that can rea-
sonably be asserted to have constitutional dimension, that alone
is in the province of the courts[.]"4 In carrying out their "special
duty"4 to participate in public life "as courts of law,"" courts
36. Id at 15.
37. For a strong critique, see generally Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781 (1983).
38. Wechsler, supra note 33, at 11.
39. Id. at 14 ("[N]o one will deny... that principles are largely instrumental as
they are employed in politics, instrumental in relation to results that a controlling senti-
ment demands at any given time. Politicians recognize this fact of life and are obliged to
trim and shape their speech and votes accordingly....!).
40. Id. at 15-16 ("No legislature or executive is obligated by the nature of its func-
tion to support its choice of values by the type of reasoned explanation that I have sug-
gested is intrinsic to judicial action... !).
41. Id. at 19. See also id. at 12 (courts are not free "to function as a naked power
organ').
42. Id. at 16.
43. Id.
44. Id at 19.
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must reach decisions having "legal quality."4 Such decisions are
"entirely principled," a criterion satisfied only if they "rest[] on
reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that
in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immedi-
ate result that is involved."4
The narrative Wechsler relays is familiar alike to tradi-
tional constitutional theorists and critics of traditional theory. It
concerns the proper relation of politics and law. Wechsler con-
structs it by presenting various qualities as dichotomous and op-
posed: reason/will; law/naked power; the principled/the ad hoc.
The first quality in each pairing must-and in his view, fortu-
nately, does-subdue the second. Thus, the Court can involve it-
self in controversial political issues of the moment without be-
coming or even seeming to become "'the partisan of a particular
set of ethical or economical opinions.'-47 In the end, Wechsler's
narrative concerns the legitimacy of judicial decision-making.
Wechsler's argument may be convincing or unconvincing.
Our point is that it is a narrative, one of many that could be
told about the nature of the judicial process and its connection
to the nation's political life. This observation is not itself a cri-
tique, for any account of the role of courts will constitute a nar-
rative about the place of the judiciary in the public realm. But it
is nonetheless important to make the observation, lest these
narrative qualities of Wechsler's account be obscured by the tra-
ditionally "analytic" form in which he presents his argument.
B. Stories About the Author and the Lawyer's Role
The narrative Wechsler relays about judge-made law is the
larger framework that houses the various stories he tells about
his own experience. These stories concern two kinds of problems
he faced in his career. First, he found himself in professional sit-
uations in which he felt obliged to argue positions he thought
morally repugnant.48 Second, he confronted situations in which
an outcome he believed to be morally correct was underpinned
by flawed legal reasoning.49 He offers the theory of neutral prin-
ciples as a solution to these dilemmas.50
45. Id
46. Id
47. Id. (quoting Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903)).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 54-56.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 57-71.




We learn quite a bit about Herbert Wechsler the man in To-
ward Neutral Principles. Because he delivered the paper as an
invited lecturer, it is not surprising that he is far less invisible
than the typical author of a scholarly article. Under the conven-
tions that have until relatively recently governed traditional law
review writing, the author adopts an impersonal style and tone,
speaking the generic voice of authority, not (overtly) his or her
own voice. Perhaps because Wechsler, in contrast, was asked to
speak on his views, he does not employ the impersonality/au-
thority conventions and instead explicitly identifies the positions
he expresses as his own.51
We learn first that Wechsler was involved as an advocate-
and not a disengaged law professor-in some of the cases of
which he speaks. He refers four separate times to his involve-
ment "as a lawyer" 52 in the decisions he discusses; in three of
the four, it is clear that he represented the Government. 53 These
references, offered in an apologetic, confessional tone, paradoxi-
cally establish Wechsler's authority to speak: he is revealed to
be an experienced professional who has done real lawyer's work
and also someone with direct, actual knowledge of some of the
cases at issue.
We learn also that Wechsler did not always argue, in his ca-
pacity as attorney/representative, positions he personally fa-
vored. Indeed, in two instances, Wechsler accompanies his dis-
closures about his involvement with an explicit disavowal of the
position he advocated. 54 From these disclaimers we can infer
51. Wechsler described his development of the neutral principles idea, and the invi-
tation to lecture about those ideas, as follows:
[While at Harvard as a Visiting Professor in 1956], I found myself developing
the neutral principles idea as a pedagogical instrument for pushing students
into subjecting their own immediate reactions of approval or disapproval of the
results of a particular decision to a more searching type of criterion of evalua-
ton ....
[I] did enough talking along this line in my teaching at Harvard and also
in chewing the rag with colleagues on the faculty, so ... when there came a
time when they were good enough to ask me to fill a vacancy in the annual
Holmes Lectureship, it was perfectly clear that what they wanted me to do was
to put up or shut up on this line that I had been following pedagogically and
disputatiously ....
Silber & Miller, supra note 34, at 925-26.
52. Wechsler, supra note 33, at 18; see also id. at 21, 27, 28.
53. Id. at 18 (referring to Walker v. Johnston, 312 US. 275 (1941), which Wechsler
argued as Special Assistant to the Attorney General); id. at 27 (referring to Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which Wechsler appeared on the brief as Assis-
tant Attorney General); id. at 28 (referring to United States v. Classic, 313 US. 299
(1941), which Wechsler argued as Special Assistant to the Attorney General).
54. Id. at 18, 27. Wechsler is especially vehement about the Governments position
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something of how Wechsler understood the lawyer's proper role.
Wechsler may have been ashamed or embarrassed about the
views he advanced in the court, but he is not ashamed or em-
barrassed that he advanced them. A lawyer, we infer, may (and
possibly must) advocate the position favored by his client, re-
gardless of the lawyer's own views of that position.55 Wechsler
thus reveals himself to have adopted the quite common view of
the lawyer as "nonaccountable," i.e., not personally responsible
for the views he expresses while acting in his professional role.
5 6
The gap between the positions Wechsler advocated in his ca-
pacity as an attorney and those he personally adopts is recapit-
ulated in Wechsler's examination of specific Supreme Court deci-
sions, especially those concerning racial segregation. Wechsler
repeatedly distinguishes between the Court's methods and rea-
soning, which he relentlessly criticizes, and its results, which he
grudgingly endorses. Wechsler begins this pattern in his discus-
sion of the cases extending Brown v. Board of Education,57 in
which the reasoning "accorded import to the nature of the edu-
cational process," 58 to noneducational contexts "such as public
transportation, parks, golf courses, bath houses, and beaches,
which no one is obliged to use . . . ."59 "That these situations
present a weaker case against state segregation is not ... what
I am saying," Wechsler explains.60 "I am saying that the ques-
tion whether it is stronger, weaker, or of equal weight appears
to me to call for principled decision."61 The problem, Wechsler
argues, is that the necessary assessment of principle cannot be
made because of the Court's practice of issuing per curiam aiFr-
in the Korematsu case. He explains that notwithstanding his participation "in the line of
duty as a lawyer," he thought of the Japanese evacuation, which the Supreme Court up-
held, as "an abomination when it happened. Id. at 27. For more on this point, see infra
text accompanying notes 82-95.
55. In a separate speech, later published, Wechsler specifically outlined his views of
the ethics of being a lawyer for the government. See Herbert Wechsler, Some Issues for
the Lawyer, in INTEGRITY AND COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONSCIENCE
117 (R.M. MacIver ed., 1957), quoted in Silber & Miller, supra note 34, at 888-90. We
describe in the text the views that emerge solely from reading Toward Neutral Princi-
ples. Our reading does not differ materially from Wechsler's statement of his views.
56. For overviews of the nonaccountability position and of alternatives that have
been offered to that position, see DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAvm LuBN, LAL ETHICS 140-
50, 177-200 (2d ed. 1995); Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L.
Rsv. 9, 12-28 (1995).
57. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).






mances in the post-Brown cases. It is not the extension of
Brown per se that disturbs him, only its method.
The distinction between process and result-and the accom-
panying dissociation between disapproval of method and ap-
proval of outcome-is most plain in Wechsler's climactic and
controversial discussion of the Brown decision itself. Brown
"stirs the deepest conflict I experience in testing the thesis I
propose."62 The problem in the decision, Wechsler explains, "in-
heres strictly in the reasoning of the opinion."63 Did the Court's
finding that segregated schools are inherently unequal turn on
evidence or judicial notice of actual harm?6 If so, it was difficult
to explain why apparently contrary evidence was ignored.65 It
was similarly difficult to explain how the decision could be auto-
matically extended, without similar factual findings, to any
other school districts.66 If, in contrast, Brown turned not on its
peculiar facts, but "on the view that racial segregation is, in
principle, a denial of equality to the minority against whom it is
directed,"67 that rationale only presents different problems. That
position requires "an inquiry into the motive of the legislature,
which is generally foreclosed to the courts...." Equally unten-
ably, it "make[s] the measure of validity of legislation the way it
is interpreted by those who are affected by it68
Wechsler concluded that the Court had erred in understand-
ing the problem of Brown in terms of discrimination. The
"human and .. .constitutional dimensions" of state-enforced
segregation were better understood, Wechsler asserted, in terms
of the "denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that
impinges in the same way on any groups or races that may be
involved. 69 But, unfortunately, "if the freedom of association is
denied by segregation, integration forces an association upon
those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant"70 Wechsler closes
his lecture by lamenting the distance between the result he
wishes for and the reasoning that might, but does not yet, sus-
tain that result:
62. Id. at 31.
63. Id. at 32.
64. Id
65. Id at 32-33.
66. Id- at 33.
67. Id
68. Id.




Given a situation where the state must practically choose between deny-
ing the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on
those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for hold-
ing that the Constitution demands that the claims for association should
prevail? I should like to think there is, but I confess that I have not yet
written the opinion. To write it is for me the challenge of the school-
segregation cases.
7'1
Notice that the process/outcome dichotomy permits Wechsler
to approve and disapprove of the result in Brown more or less
simultaneously. On the one hand, he repeatedly tells us it is a
result he prefers, and that extensions of it to other contexts are
not necessarily wrong. At the same time, however, he tells us
that a decision cannot properly be characterized as truly "legal"
unless it can meet standards of neutrality and generality that
Brown in fact does not meet. In this sense, Brown is plainly
wrong. And this is so regardless of the good intentions of the
Court and of those who support desegregation.
C. The Rhetoric of Toward Neutral Principles
From a technical perspective, Wechsler is a master rhetori-
cian. He follows Aristotle's dicta in Book 3, Chapter 9 of the
Rhetoric, concerning the uses of periodic style. Aristotle defines
the periodic style as "a portion of speech that has in itself a be-
ginning and an end."72 Language of this kind, Aristotle contin-
ues, "is satisfying, and easy to follow. It is satisfying because it
is just the reverse of indefinite; and moreover, the hearer al-
ways feels that he is grasping something and has reached some
definite conclusion."73 Wechsler practices this style with flourish
and aplomb. Toward Neutral Principles employs direct addresses
to the reader again and again.74 It also employs over and over
sequences of escalating questions or negative assertions, draw-
71. Id.
72. AmsroTLE, RBanroc llI.9.1409a35-36, in COMPLETE WoRKs, supra note 21.
73. Id. at llI.9.1409bl-3.
74. Look at the following phrases: "If you abide with me thus far, I doubt that you
will hesitate upon the final step," Wechsler, supra note 33, at 4; "I submit" and "I need
not say," id. at 9; "Think of.. 7 and "You will not doubt," id. at 10; "Whatever you may
think to be the answer, surely you agree with me that I am right to state. . . ," id. at
11; "You will not charge me with exaggeration if I say... ," id. at 12; "All I have said,
you may reply, is ... ,Y" id at 14; "You will not understand.. 2 and "I would certainly
remind you," id. at 16; "Nor will you take me to deny.. !' and "Nor will you even think
that I deem.. !' and "Would any of us have it otherwise... ?," id. at 17. This list of
examples could be lengthened.
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ing the reader into his reasoning processes.75 Indeed, we call
Wechsler a rhetorician in Toward Neutral Principles in admira-
tion for the control of language and audience he achieves. This,
too, is a story, the story of a man who has mastered forensic
style and argumentation. But to what end?
A rhetorician needs an agonist, a voice to which his oratory
responds, and Wechsler provides this agonistic voice in the re-
doubtable person of Judge Learned Hand, the previous year's
Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecturer at Harvard Law School. 76 The
embedded debate allows Wechsler to write a more conversa-
tional prose than that usually found in drier, more strictly com-
posed law review articles. A conventional article, for example, is
unlikely to appeal to its readers with expressions such as "Am I
not right, however, in believing... ?," "I need not say... "
"You will not doubt... ," and "I put it to you that ... ."" In
other words, Wechsler uses the interactive conventions of ora-
tory and the strategies they permit in addition to the conven-
tions of written academic disputation.78 In so doing, he simulta-
neously addresses his Harvard audience and Judge Hand.
The debate between Wechsler and Judge Hand forms what
we might call the frame story of Toward Neutral Principles. It
operates as a frame story because it contains the more detailed
stories that Toward Neutral Principles tells. Wechsler's article
has the structure of a set of Russian dolls.79 The largest doll is
the narrative we have discussed concerning the legitimacy of
judge-made law. Inside that doll is a slightly smaller one that is
the frame story, which presents the rhetorical situation as a de-
75. The phrase "Nor is it" is repeated three times. Id. at 31-32. A sequence of 'II"
questions follows a passage from Hand on judicial power. Id. at 6. Questions beginning
"Is it not clear.. .?" or the equivalent organize a paragraph at id. at 11. At id. at 12, a
sequence of questions goes as follows: "Did not New England challenge... ?," "Was not
Jefferson... ?," "Can you square his [Jefferson's] disappointment about Burr's acquittal
... ?," "Were the abolitionists . .. ?" At id. at 16, a sequence of questions takes this
form: "Does not... ?," "Is there not... ?," "Does not ... ?," "Is it not also ... 7" This
kind of repetitive stylistic tactic is a version of anaphora.
76. Hand's lectures, delivered in 1958, are reprinted in LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: TnE OLIVER WENDE L HoLMEs LECrums, 1958 (1958). Hand is also an impressive
rhetorician. Interestingly, he like Wechsler criticized the Brown decision, albeit on the
very different ground that the Court had inappropriately "assume[d] the role of a third
legislative chamber." Id. at 55. For a description of Hand's lectures and the reaction to
them, see GERALD GUNTHiER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 652-64 (1994).
77. Wechsler, supra note 33, at 7, 9, 10, 15.
78. Note that we also use the conventions of direct address and questions in the
first paragraph of this article.
79. For a recent history of this wooden toy, called a matreshka or matrioshka doll,
see ALI sON HILTON, RussIAN FOLK ART 127 (1995).
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bate between Judge Learned Hand and Herbert Wechsler. A doll
that is smaller still represents the stories Wechsler tells about
particular cases to convey how he has come to define the act of
lawyering in the course of his career as a litigator. The nugget
doll-the one that is not hollow-represents the theory of neu-
tral principles itself. Only by unscrewing and removing each doll
one by one can one arrive at this core theory.
One key story Wechsler tells within the debate frame
reveals his advocacy role in some of the cases he discusses. We
focus on one striking case, Korematsu v. United States,8 ° involv-
ing the internment of Japanese Americans as an alleged secur-
ity threat during World War II. In Toward Neutral Principles,
Wechsler remarks of this case:
Only the other day I read that the Japanese evacuation, which I thought
an abomination when it happened, though in the line of duty as a lawyer
I participated in the effort to sustain it in the Court, is now believed by
many to have been a blessing to its victims, breaking down forever the
ghettos in which they had previously lived.8'
In a 1993 interview, Wechsler reveals that he had doubts at
the time about the constitutionality of relocating Japanese citi-
zens.82 In that interview, he remarks that Korematsu and its
companion cases 83 "were nice cases for testing the role of the
government lawyer."84 Wechsler reports that he and other Jus-
tice Department lawyers "declined to make arguments that the
War Department in particular wanted to be made, which we
considered to be specious, either in law or in fact"85 In particu-
lar, Wechsler explains, lawyers in the Justice Department
sought to avoid reliance on the Final Report prepared for the
War Department by Commanding General John L. DeWitt,
which described the purported security threat posed by Japa-
nese-Americans, "because we regarded it as spurious. 86 Wechs-
80. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
81. Wechsler, supra note 33, at 27. At the time Korematsu was argued, Wechsler
was serving in the Justice Department as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
War Division. See Silber & Miller, supra note 34, at 882.
82. Silber & Miller, supra note 34, at 883.
83. In addition to Korematsu, other cases involving Japanese Americans included
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 US. 81 (1943) (in which Wechsler did not participate),
and Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (in which Wechsler did).
84. Silber & Miller, supra note 34, at 883. Dissenting in Korematsu, Justice Murphy
concluded that its ruling was a "legalization of racism' 323 US. at 242.
85. Silber & Miller, supra note 34, at 883.
86. Id. As we describe infra in the text accompanying notes 90-92, by the time the
Justice Department lawyers were preparing their presentation to the Supreme Court in
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ler goes on to say:
[There was no possibility of anything being urged that wasn't true. And
so the argument in support was made. It was made with recognition of
the difficulty and importance of the case. That was also true of the com-
panion case involving the effort of the War Relocation Authority to con-
trol the departure of Japanese-Americans from relocation centers, which
we lost and were delighted to lose.
87
At first blush, Wechsler appears to contradict himself. He
espouses neutral principles, principles extending beyond the
case at hand, as a legal ideal. Yet he admits to having partici-
pated as a lawyer in acts he found abhorrent in the terms of his
own ideals-behavior he would hardly want to generalize be-
yond the individual cases in which he engaged. He justifies his
participation with a military phrase, "in the line of duty," which
is usually used to disclaim personal responsibility.
But Wechsler later reconstructed his involvement in a way
that permitted him both to take and to escape responsibility.
Echoing his vision of the nonaccountable lawyer, Wechsler con-
ceptualized his involvement in these controversial cases in
terms of role:
I did superintend the preparation of [the Korematsu] brief... I did
it because it seemed to me that the separation of function in society jus-
tified and, indeed, required the course that I pursued; that is to say that
Korematsu, they had received information from the FBI, the FCC, and Naval Intelli-
gence that contradicted the DeWitt Report. For a description of the debate within the
Justice Department over the use of the DeWitt Report, in which Wechsler's role appears
considerably less than passive or benign, see PETER IRONS, JUSTIcE AT WAIL THE STORY
OF THE JAPANESE AMmCAN N RmEmNr cAsEs 278-92 (1983) [hereinafter IRONS, JUsTrICE
AT WAR]. See also supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
In 1983, Fred Korematsu filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, and in
1984 his conviction was overturned. The record in the case is reprinted in JUSTICE
DELAYED: THE REcoRD OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERMIENT CASES 125-376 (Peter
Irons ed., 1989). Judge Marilyn H. Patel's opinion granting the writ concluded that "the
government deliberately omitted relevant information and provided misleading informa-
tion in papers before the court.... The judicial process is seriously impaired when the
government's law enforcement officers violate their ethical obligations to the court."
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
For an overview of the wartime experiences of Japanese Americans, told "through
the voices of those who were young at the time," see ELLEN LEVINE, A FENCE AWAY FROM
FREEDOM: JAPANEsE AmERIcANs AND WORLD WAR II ix (1995). For a collection of articles
about the internment and the legal struggles relating to it, see THE MASS INTERNIENT OF
JAPANEsE AMERIcANs AND THE QUEST FOR LEGAL REDRESS (Charles McClain ed., 1994).
87. Silber & Miller, supra note 34, at 885. Wechsler refers here to Ex Parte Endo,
323 U.S. 283 (1944), which involved a challenge to the lawfulness of detention under the
internment orders. Regarding the Endo case, see IRONS, JusTIcE AT WAR, supra note 86,
at 307-10.
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it was not my responsibility to order or not to order the Japanese evacu-
ation.... It was the responsibility of the President of the United States.
... Neither was it... my responsibility to determine whether the evacu-
ation was constitutional or not constitutional. That was the responsibility
.. of the Supreme Court of the United States....
I suggest to you, in short, that one of the ways in which a rich soci-
ety avoids what might otherwise prove to be insoluble dilemmas of choice
is to recognize a separation of functions, a distribution of responsibilities,
with respect to problems of this kind, and this is particularly recurrent
in the legal profession.M
It does not take a special astuteness to see in this vision of
role differentiation the skeleton of the process jurisprudence
which, with Toward Neutral Principles, made Wechsler a house-
hold name in the law school world.8 9 Combining Wechsler's re-
sponsible role argument with his theory of neutral principles
yields a view of lawyering that at once exonerates him for par-
ticipating in a case he did not personally believe in, and offers a
model for the Supreme Court to follow. A process view of juris-
prudence frees Wechsler from a dilemma, that there is no neu-
tral principle that characterizes Korematsu. To see how this
works, we can examine a detail of Wechsler's role in
Korematsu.90
88. Wechsler, supra note 55, at 890.
89. See PAUL A. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WEcHsLER's THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988). A "rough-and-ready description7 of the legal process
school is as follows:
The legal process school focuses primary attention on who is, or ought, to make
a given legal decision, and how that decision is, or ought, to be made. Is, or
ought, a particular legal question to be resolved by the federal or the state gov-
ernment? By courts, legislatures, or executive agencies? If by courts, at the
trial level or by appellate tribunals? If at trial, by judges or juries? Subject to
what standard of appellate review? And so on.
Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REv. 688, 691 (1989) (book review).
On the continuing influence of the legal process model, see Richard J. Fallon, Jr., Re-
flections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. I, REV. 953 (1994).
90. As noted above, see supra note 86, a controversial aspect of that case concerned
the validity of General DeWitt's Final Report. US. Department of War, Final Report,
Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast (1943). The first version of the Report "im-
plied that Japanese Americans constituted such a 'tightly-knit racial group' that separa-
tion by loyalty could not have been accomplished by any means." IRoNs, JUSTIcE AT WAR,
supra note 86, at 208. That would have contradicted the government's contention in ear-
lier cases that since time did not allow individual determinations of loyalty to be made,
all Japanese Americans should be restricted. See id. After some negotiation, DeWitt re-
wrote the Report to say that "no ready means existed for determining the loyal and the
disloyal with any degree of safety." Id. at 210. The Justice Department did not see the
full report until it was released to the public in January 1944. See id. at 211-12. Neither
the FBI nor the FCC was able to verify the Report's allegations that Japanese Ameri-
cans had committed acts of espionage with signal lights and radio transmissions, allega-
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By the time the Justice Department wrote the Korematsu
brief, the DeWitt Report, which purported to supply the facts
demonstrating the dangers posed by Japanese Americans, had
been substantially discredited. John Burling, the chief author of
the Justice Department's brief, appended a footnote warning the
Court that "the contrariety of the .reports" with respect to alle-
gations of espionage was such that "we do not ask the Court to
take judicial notice of the recital of those facts contained in the
Report" 91 This warning provoked outrage from the War Depart-
ment; in the ensuing wrangling, printing of the brief was halted,
and Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler rewrote the
warning footnote.9 2 The new version said simply: "We have spe-
cifically recited in this brief the facts relating to the justification
for the evacuation, of which we ask the Court to take judicial
notice; and we rely upon the Final Report only to the extent
that it relates to such facts" 93 The Court's final Korematsu opin-
ion referred in a general way to "military necessity,"94 and one
of the only doctrinal aspects of Korematsu that survives is that
military necessity of sufficient urgency justifies racial
discrimination.9
Let us examine Wechsler's rewritten footnote along with his
remark in Toward Neutral Principles concerning his Korematsu
role. Burling's footnote had explicitly called into question any re-
lationship between the DeWitt Report and "facts"; in marked
contrast, Wechsler's version repeats the word "facts" twice, first
in an assertion of their presence in the brief, and then in an-
ambiguous reference to the relationship between the Final Re-
port and "such facts." Wechsler's note might be taken to imply a
problem with the factuality of the Final Report. But it might
tions essential to the argument that the Japanese Americans posed a security threat. Id.
at 279-84.
91. IRONS, JuSTicE AT WA, supra note 86, at 286. Mhere is sharp controversy as to
the credibility of the DeWitt report." Korematsu v. United States, 323 US. 214, 245
(1994) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
92. IRONS, JusTicE AT WAR, supra note 86, at 286-92.
93. Id. at 290-91.
94. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 ("apprehension by the proper military authori-
ties of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety"); id. at 219 ("a military impera-
tive"); id. at 223 ("the military urgency of the situation").
95. See JAcowus TENBROEK ET AL., PRmICE, WAR AND THE CONSrTTTON (1954);
Nanette Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme
Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUI. L. REv. 175 (1945).
Not all the Justices concurred in this view. Justice Murphy, for example, wrote: "I
dissent... from this legalization of racism. Racial discrimination in any form and in




also be read as a simple assertion that the brief presents its
"facts" to the Court independently, even if in corroboration, of
the Report.96 In other words, the note distances the Korematsu
brief from the DeWitt Report with one hand, while with the
other pointing to the identical conclusion arrived at in each doc-
ument: that Japanese Americans should be relocated.
Now we can return to Wechsler's statement that although
he thought the Japanese evacuation an "abomination," he
helped to sustain it in the Court "in the line of duty as a law-
yer 97 His language in this sentence is startling. First, "abomi-
nation" is a powerful word with Biblical associations to the
Levitican ideas of pollution and moral taint.98 Second, "in the
line of duty" is a military phrase. Using such an expression to
justify the claim of "military necessity" situates the Justice De-
partment in a position parallel to that of the War Department
in pursuing military objectives. 99
However, Wechsler undercuts these charged terms even as
he uses them. The sentence begins with disarming casualness:
"Only the other day I read... . The entire sentence highlights
a Newsweek article that conveniently concludes the Japanese
evacuations to have been a "blessing" in disguise, helping Japa-
nese Americans to move out of ethnic ghettos. 100 So even though
he thought the evacuation an "abomination" when it occurred,
Wechsler serendipitously finds, fifteen years later, that it turns
out inadvertently to have been justified on grounds utterly dif-
ferent from those on which it was argued. Finally, Toward Neu-
tral Principles produces a theory that would erase the sort of
moral quandary set in motion at the Justice Department by
Korematsu.101
96. See Arval A. Morris, Justice, War, and the Japanese-American Evacuation and
Internment, 59 WAs. L REV. 843, 859-60 (1984) ("[It would take a very clever and dis-
criminating reading between the lines to discern any substantive criticisms of General
DeWitt's Final Report."). Morris goes on to call the footnote "misleading semantic ambi-
guity. Id. at 860.
97. Wechsler, supra note 33, at 27; see supra text accompanying notes 54, 82-88.
98. MARY DOUGLAS, PUnm AND DANGF& AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION
AN TABoo (1984).
99. In the 1993 interview, Wechsler disclaimed that the Justice Department was do-
ing the War Department's bidding. See Silber & Miller, supra note 34, at 886.
100. Disguised Blessing, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 29, 1958, at 23, cited in Wechsler, supra
note 33, at 27 n.91.
101. On the moral quandary, see Peter Irons, Fancy Dancing at the Marble Palace, 3
CONST. CoinfmrARY 36 (1986).
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D. Can We Be Neutral About Toward Neutral Principles?
We have analyzed the narrative structure of Toward Neu-
tral Principles and used the metaphor of a Russian doll to illus-
trate the ways Wechsler presents his material. He opens by set-
ting himself a large question, which he describes as "that most
abiding problem of our public law: the role of courts in general
and the Supreme Court in particular in our constitutional tradi-
tion; their special function in the maintenance, interpretation
and development of the organic charter that provides the frame-
work of our government, the charter that declares itself the 'su-
preme law.'"102 We have called this "abiding problem" the over-
arching narrative of Toward Neutral Principles. Having situated
that narrative, Wechsler goes on to frame his approach to it as a
debate between himself and Judge Learned Hand. We have
called this debate the frame story. The frame established,
Wechsler proceeds to the theory of neutral principles, which he
argues in large part by recounting several stories about particu-
lar cases and his role in them. This structure produces an effec-
tive argument, and is part of the reason Toward Neutral Princi-
ples became a much cited landmark article in constitutional
legal scholarship. Wechsler is a skilled rhetorician and a good
writer.
When we initially defined narrative, we used the example of
Sophocles' Oedipus Rex. Indeed, Toward Neutral Principles may
be said to employ a narrative structure of embedded stories very
like the narrative structure of Oedipus.10 3 Wechsler's grand nar-
rative concerning judge-made law parallels the Sophoclean
grand narrative of transgression and punishment. The Wechsler/
Hand debate grid that sets off Toward Neutral Principles paral-
lels the dilemma of the plague in Thebes that sets Oedipus'
detective work in motion. The stories of Wechsler's advocacy
roles parallel the multiple stories that make up the ill-fated
Oedipus' family history. And each narrative closes with a cultur-
ally meaningful resolution acceptable to its particular audience:
the theory of neutral principles for Wechsler; blindness and exile
for Oedipus, who is accompanied to Colonus by his daughter
Antigone.10
4
102. Wechsler, supra note 33, at 1.
103. Oedipus is the key text in Aristotle's Poetics; as such, it holds a special, almost
primal, place in the canon of Western literature. The Poetics can be found in II THE Co -
PLETE WORKS, supra note 21. The standard teaching edition is ARISTOTLE'S POETICS
(James Hutton trans., 1982).
104. We are not suggesting either that Toward Neutral Principles is a tragedy or
that Wechsler is a tragic hero. Although there may be fatal flaws in both protagonists,
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We claim that any law review article could be shown to
have a narrative structure. Toward Neutral Principles's struc-
ture works like a Russian doll, one possible narrative model, al-
though not the only one. The same narrative model works to an-
alyze our own writing practice in this Article. Our grand
narrative also asks a large question which serves as our title: is
law narrative? We establish a frame story by taking Wechsler's
famous article as an agonist, a worthy text with which we wres-
tle in order to demonstrate our claims. And we embed several
stories in our article: the story of Oedipus Rex, perhaps re-
minding readers that one of us is a literature professor; the
story of Russian matreshka dolls10 5; the story of the abiding
value of classical rhetoric; perhaps even the story of our own
collaboration.
10 6
We have also occluded some of our views. We argue that we
are doing a strictly structural analysis of Toward Neutral Prin-
ciples and that we abstain from taking a position on its account
of how best to interpret the Constitution. Yet, of course, we can-
not help but hold such a position. We disagree with Wechsler
that a theory of neutral principles resolves the problems he puts
forward, because we are anti-foundationalists (see below) who
harbor radical doubts concerning the possibility of arriving at
pure objectivity or neutrality, however laudable that goal. And
we find Wechsler's advocacy practice at certain moments, in par-
ticular his participation in Korematsu, reprehensible because we
do not believe his process jurisprudence and its role theory pre-
cludes his having to take responsibility for actively participating
in something he thought, and we think, was an "abomination."
Like Wechsler, we have just made some confessions. Is Law
Narrative? is susceptible to precisely the kind of critique to
which we have just submitted Toward Neutral Principles. We
can only hope that we would emerge from such a critique with
the same verdict that we assign to Wechsler, that of being
skilled writers of legal scholarship.
our analogies are purely structural.
105. A psychoanalytic critic would no doubt make something of the history and ma-
ternal imagery of these "mother" dolls.
106. Since we met as neighbors and came to know each other over several years of
standing with our children at the same school bus stop, is it perhaps not coincidental




In what ways is it useful to see the stories in Toward Neu-
tral Principles and to focus on its narrative structure? Does the
exercise help us to read the article more insightfully, to under-
stand better what Wechsler was trying to say? Or, to the con-
trary, does it distort our reading of the article and make it into
something Wechsler would barely recognize? And would such
distortion, if it occurred, be wrong or unfair?
1°7
The answer to these questions depends on what it means to
read insightfully and fairly. In fact, the process of reading, of
understanding the meaning of a presentation such as Wechs-
ler's, is quite complex. Part of that process may include trying to
ascertain the ideas the speaker/author intended to communicate,
but that is only a part.108 Other parts of the process may include
such things as knowing the immediate context in which the
speaker/author is acting (a lecture at Harvard Law school; a
dinner table conversation), putting the author's ideas in a con-
text of others on the same topic (such as alternative views of
constitutional interpretation), understanding the larger context
to which the speaker/author wishes to contribute (ideas about
law generally), or discovering the speaker/author's investments
in the issues. This list is by no means exhaustive. Meaning is
complicated. Focusing on the varying narrative elements of a
traditional essay such as Toward Neutral Principles helps
demonstrate how complex the process of making sense of things
can be.
A. Stories as Conventions
Wechsler could have tried to convey his points about the
need for neutral principles and the flaws of the Brown decision
by telling a story directly. Consider the following very rough
example:
107. We have been careful about our definitions thus far. Since we employ a neolog-
ism, let us explain that the term "to narrativize" encompasses the questions asked in
this paragraph.
108. Authorial intention is vexingly difficult to reconstruct from textual evidence
alone. For the classic literary critical article on this subject, see William K Wimsatt &
Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, 54 SEWANEE REv. 468 (1946), reprinted in
THE CRITICAL TRADITION: CLASSIc TEXTS AND CONTEm ORARY TRENDs 1383 (David Richter
ed., 1989). THE CRrrICAL TRADrION also reprints several responses to The Intentional
Fallacy: E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Objective Criticism, supra at 1392; P.D. Juhl, Does a Literary
Work Have One and Only One Correct Interpretation?, supra, at 1411; and Steven Knapp
& Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, supra, at 1424).
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I am a lawyer for the government. I have devoted my career to ad-
vancing the civil rights of blacks, specifically, to ending segregation and
Jim Crow. And I was greatly relieved when the U.S. Supreme Court de-
cided Brown v. Board of Education, for I believed that I now had an au-
thoritative precedent that I could invoke in future cases.
Soon after the decision in Brown, I was assigned a new case involv-
ing a segregated swimming pool [bus system, park, golf course, etc.). Ini-
tially, I was sure I would be able to obtain a judgment that barring
blacks from the pool was unlawful. But when I tried to write the brief
and argue the case, I discovered there were problems. Brown turned on
some factual findings about the harm to children attending segregated
schools. I could not see how similar findings could be reached in the case
of a swimming pool. Moreover, the Court seemed to suggest in Brown
that segregation is wrongful per se as a denial of equality to the minority
against whom it is directed. But not all differences in treatment are une-
qual, so this finding seemed to require an investigation of legislative in-
tent to discriminate--an investigation I was certain I could not get the
court to make in my swimming pool case.
In the end, I won the case anyway. The court issued an order requir-
ing nondiscriminatory access, but its opinion was very vague, merely re-
citing the facts of the immediate case and holding that 'under Brown
such treatment cannot continue? Although I was glad to get a good out-
come for my clients, I felt curiously deflated. As a matter of law, Brown
probably did not demand the desegregation of the pool. I felt that the
court in my case, and perhaps even the Supreme Court in Brown itself,
had merely acted expediently, in response to political pressures. I won-
dered whether such decisions in time would lose their legitimacy as law,
just as I felt in making my arguments I had to some extent compromised
my own legitimacy as a lawyer.
Is the point of this story the same as that of Toward Neu-
tral Principles? In some ways, yes: the absence of a truly defen-
sible (i.e., neutral, general) rationale for Brown renders that de-
cision less helpful to the lawyer who narrates the story, and
ultimately makes him uncomfortable with himself as a profes-
sional and with his profession. What would we, the story's audi-
ence, learn? That courts should decide cases using neutral and
general principles.
But maybe this story fails to convey the point of Toward
Neutral Principles. Wechsler speaks there of judicial legitimacy,
of judge-made law. Perhaps only a story about a judge's experi-
ence, rather than a lawyer's, could effectively make this point.
Notice that we have to "know" the point of Toward Neutral
Principles to evaluate these assertions, but we come to Toward
Neutral Principles after the fact, as readers; our problem is in-
terpretive. Before the fact, Wechsler, knowing his own point,
could easily have chosen to present it in a form his listeners
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would have recognized intuitively as a story. Or perhaps he
could have prefaced his article with this "story"-as, for exam-
ple, Susan Estrich prefaces her article on rape law with a per-
sonal account of her own rape.10 9 Had he situated himself so
overtly with respect to the principles he espouses, and has felt
the lack of in cases that have caused him personal moral
anguish, that shift in his engagement with the argument might
have produced a concomitant shift in the reader's response. All
this is to say that Wechsler's primary decision before the fact in-
volved determining the best, most effective way to deliver the
message (the "point") he had in mind, and that determination
required a choice whether to use the overt story format or some
other. As readers after the fact, we know he opted for the quite
different format of what can be called the academic
disputation. 1 0
We do not pretend to know anything about Wechsler's ac-
tual thought process as he prepared his remarks. We focus on
(some of) the available alternatives to the format in which To-
ward Neutral Principles appears in order to highlight the fact
that, in deciding how to deliver his message, Wechsler, like all
persons seeking to communicate, had to choose among various
available forms for presenting his ideas. A story is one such
form, an academic speech another.
The choice of forms is important because different expecta-
tions tend to accompany different forms. Assume along the lines
of our earlier speculation that Wechsler had chosen to present
his ideas by telling "war stories" from his own experiences. The
audience might have heard Toward Neutral Principles very dif-
ferently. Many lawyers who are not academics tell war stories,
so perhaps listeners would have heard the message as less
scholarly than it looked in its speech form. War stories are de-
rived from an individual's own unique experiences, so perhaps
the audience would have interpreted Wechsler to be describing
only one person's idiosyncratic troubles with Brown. And there
would be an added irony here, since Korematsu, for example, is,
quite literally, a war story in itself, a story in which Wechsler
acted "in the line of duty."""
These possible expectations or reactions to the war story
form are not in any sense "natural." To the contrary, they are
109. Estrich, supra note 5, at 1087-88.
110. An academic disputation, like an article, a treatise, or any other text, can have
narrative elements without taking the overt form of a story. That is one of the main ar-
guments we wish to make.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 89-101.
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artificial and contingent, dependent on any number of factors
that could have been otherwise: who has told such stories in the
past, what those persons have said, the audience members' prior
encounters with war stories, and so on."2 Yet however artificial
or contingent the connection between a particular form and the
expectations that accompany it, once the connection is made, the
decision to adopt the form is in effect a decision to invoke the
expectations. In this sense, the choice of one communicative
form-a story, a speech-is strategic. One employs the form one
believes will be most persuasive, given the expectations and as-
sociations one perceives to be connected to that form.
And yet the choice can never be only strategic. For if differ-
ent expectations accompany different forms, then the choice of
form will affect meaning as well. The choice to "tell" Toward
Neutral Principles as an overt story would of necessity have
changed the "point" that got made.
B. Stories as Constructs
Earlier, we stated that "Wechsler's narrative [in Toward
Neutral Principles] concerns the legitimacy of judicial decision
making."13 It is here that many modern legal theorists would
argue that since the vision of legitimacy in Toward Neutral
Principles can be contested, Wechsler's argument is "only a
story."" 4 But although Toward Neutral Principles can be
presented as a narrative of legitimacy, there is nothing in the
form or the tone of the article to suggest that Wechsler actually
thought of himself as employing a narrative structure or telling
stories. To the contrary, there is every indication that Wechsler
regarded Toward Neutral Principles as offering true (albeit po-
tentially controversial) observations about constitutional law
112. On the contingency of conventions and responses to conventional genres, see
Stanley Fish, Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics, in Is THERE A TExT IN THIS
CLASS? THE AuTHoRrrY OF INTERPRETIvE COMMUNITIES 21 (1980). On how conventions
trigger responses, see UmBERTO Eco, THE ROLE OF THE READE&- EXPLORATIONS IN THE
SEMIOTICS OF TEXTS (1979); WOLFGANG ISER, THE ACT OF READING: A THEORY OF AEs-
THETIC RESPONSE (1978); HANS ROBERT JAUSS, TOWARD AN AESTHETIC OF RECEPTION (1982);
THE READER IN THE TEXTn ESSAYS ON AUDIENCE AND INTERPRETATION (Susan R. Suleiman
& Inge Crosman eds., 1980); READER-RESPONSE CRIcIsM: FROM FORMALISM TO POST-
STRUcTURALm (Jane P. Tompkins ed., 1980).
113. See supra text accompanying note 36.
114. See, eg., Delgado, supra note 16, at 814 (describing the notions of freedom and
consent in tort law as "narratives"); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the
Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systematic Social
Ills?, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 1258, 1280 (1992) (portraying as a narrative the First Amend-
ment notion of a marketplace of ideas).
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and judicial decision-making. The contrast between viewing To-
ward Neutral Principles as (just) a story-or, to be more precise,
a narrative containing various stories-and viewing it as (a ver-
sion of) the "truth" is useful because it highlights how persua-
sion occurs against, and depends upon, a series of ordinarily in-
visible background assumptions about how the world really is
and what questions are worth asking. Putting the conflict
bluntly: what is truth to one can be (just a) story to another.
What does it mean to say that Wechsler's article is "just a
story"? We are not proposing that the narrative elements in To-
ward Neutral Principles diminish its argument. Rather, we
claim that its argument can be read as a narrative, and that its
narrativity contextualizes this argument both personally and
historically. Toward Neutral Principles, inescapably, is of its
time and place and culture. It was written in a period in which
the United States was developing exponentially as a world
power, growing economically, and beginning a long road toward
equal rights for its African-American citizens. To read the article
as narrating the place of judicial decision-making within this
context is to enrich our understanding of Wechsler's theme.
Whether we agree with Wechsler or not, the investments he had
in making his case for neutrality come into clearer relief if we
are able to read the narrative of Toward Neutral Principles.
We could imagine someone in Wechsler's shoes raising objec-
tions along the following lines:
You may differ with me over the nature of judicial decision making. You
may think rm wrong about Brown in particular and neutral principles in
general. If that is all you mean by calling my article a story, then why
don't you just say so? That is, why is it better to "tell the story" of To-
ward Neutral Principles than to say "Toward Neutral Principles presents
an erroneous (or idealized, or dangerous, or whatever) view of constitu-
tional law? If, on the other hand, you mean to say only that Toward Neu-
tral Principles presents one vision (= "story") of constitutional law and
that other visions (= "stories") vie with mine within constitutional theory,
then fine, but so what? You've just renamed what traditional legal theo-
rists customarily call "positions" or "arguments" as "stories." Why is your
new label better?
These objections arise out of a view of law that holds there
is an ultimate "truth" of constitutional decision-making. Thus,
there are better and worse, right or wrong ideas about things
such as judicial review. Concepts such as better and worse, cor-
rect or incorrect require comparison to a fixed point of reference.
Only from a foundational place or ground of ultimate "truth"
can we judge who is "right" or "wrong" about constitutional law.
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And the spatial metaphor of "positions" only reinforces this idea
of an essential truth that we can be closer to or farther from. It
may be that neither law professors nor judges-even those on
the United States Supreme Court-have unmediated access to
this foundational truth. Nonetheless, getting as close to it as
possible remains the goal.
Sometimes the contention that a particular legal argu-
ment-in an article, say, or a judicial opinion-is (just) a story
can appropriately be translated: that argument is not in fact a
correct interpretation/understanding of the law in question.
Sometimes, in other words, the word "story" is used, as in the
paragraph above, more or less as a synonym for "position," or-
more accurately----"your position." When someone labels an oppo-
nent's argument a "story" in this sense, he or she is disagreeing
with the opponent on the merits of the particular point in ques-
tion and, possibly, attempting to disparage the opponent's posi-
tion. But he or she is not disputing the concept of "the merits."
The opponent has just gotten things wrong ("told a story") and
not right ("gotten at the truth of the matter"). We will call this
the foundationalist challenge.
But other characterizations of an argument as (just) a story
attempt to go in a different direction. They are meant to high-
light the absence of any neutral position from which one could
gauge the relative merits of contending positions and to ques-
tion whether there is any way to recognize an essential "truth"
to which one can be close or far. To question whether there is a
neutral, objective method for discovering or determining truth is
not necessarily to question whether there is truth at all, al-
though some theorists might go that far.115 The claims we ex-
115. Some recent critiques of science have been accused of arguing that there is no
such thing as reality. Such an accusation was the premise of a recent hoax in which a
professor of physics submitted to a scholarly journal called Social Text a parody of the
cultural studies of science, inspired by NORMAN LEVlrr & PAUL R. GROSS, HIGHER SUPER-
SITHON: THE ACADEMIC LEFT AN ITs QUARREL wm SCIENCE (1994). Alan D. Sokal, Trans-
gressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,
46/47 SOCIAL TEXT 217 (Spring/Summer 1996). The physicist revealed the hoax only after
the issue was in print. Alan D. Sokal, A Physicist Experiments with Cultural Studies, 6
LINGUA FRANCA no. 4 at 62 (May/June 1996). For an account of the flap, see Janny Scott,
Postmodern Gravity Deconstructed, Slyly, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1996, at Al.
As was pointed out in an Op-Ed piece written in response to the reports about the
hoax, see Stanley Fish, Professor Sokol's Bad Joke, N.Y. TIMEs, May 21, 1996, at A23,
anti-foundationalists do not claim that the world is not real. Rather, they try to demon-
strate that scientific empiricism and objectivity cannot ever be fully divorced from the
conditions under which science is practiced. The practice of science occurs within non-
objective parameters such as public and private funding trends, employment practices in
scientific institutes and universities, consumer demand, corporate profits, and state and
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amine here tend to be epistemological rather than ontological;
they focus less on whether facts or reality exist than on how we
come to "know" what we consider factual and real. If one takes
as one's premise the notion that truth always comes to us medi-
ated in some way-by language, culture, or other social con-
structions-then it becomes important to understand the medi-
ating processes, especially their politics or ideologies. When used
this way, the contention that a particular legal writing is (just)
a story should be translated: that argument reflects and derives
from assumptions about the world which your presentation has
rendered invisible, but which it is important to expose and to
question. When someone labels an opponent's argument a
"story" in this sense, he or she refuses to join issue on the mer-
its of the particular point in question because he or she wishes
to dispute the concept of "the merits." What he or she is trying
to do by labeling the opponent's argument a "story" is to
problematize the framework from which the opponent has
argued. 116
This problematization does not require that there be some
"better" framework from which argumentation could proceed; in-
deed, this use of the "story" characterization often proceeds from
the position that frameworks cannot be ranked abstractly as
better or worse, because there is not and cannot be any neutral
correct point from which to engage in comparative assess-
ment.117 Relatedly, this problematization views frameworks as
military sponsorship. All of these things affect the kinds of questions whose answers are
sought, and the approaches to finding answers. In the U.S., mercantile capitalism largely
controls the conditions under which scientific work may take place. Science studies in-
vestigate these conditions rather than the premises of scientific research itself A forth-
coming collection of essays reviews the current state of debates about science, see SCI.
ENCE WARS (Andrew Ross ed., 1996).
116. See, eg., Delgado, supra note 8, at 549:
[Some] Critical Race scholars do write chronicles, parables, and narratives. We
use them to explore ideology and mind-set. Stories are a great device for prob-
ing the dominant narrative. We use them to examine presupposition, the body
of received wisdoms that pass as truth but actually are contingent, power-
serving, and drastically disadvantage our people.
117. Again, we are not asserting that people-anti-foundationalists and foundation-
alists alike-do not actually engage in the practice of ranking frameworks. In ordinary
day to day life, some ideas seem more useful or helpful-indeed, more true-than others.
For example, I might make an assessment that there is a chair beneath me before I sit
down because in the context of the decision I have to make ("should I sit or stand?") it is
rational and helpful to adopt the standpoint of empiricism ("I can sit because I see there
is a chair there"). In another context, such as examining my belief in God, I might reject
the empirical framework, arguing from faith that God exists even if that existence is not
subject to empirical verification.
But this practice of relying on frameworks in day to day life does not mean that we
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inherently and unavoidably value-laden. The point of narrativiz-
ing is to expose and thereby subject to debate the values hidden
by the apparently nonnarrative format of pieces written in
traditional "academic" styles. We will call this the anti-
foundationalist challenge.
Antifoundationalists hold that arguments, legal or other,
are not made in a vacuum, but are constructed within a context
of many factors: political beliefs, moral values, philosophical
principles. A legal argument, in the antifoundationalist view, al-
ways arises at a particular historical moment or within a spe-
cific set of jurisprudential debates. In addition, arguments, like
perceptions of events and objects in the world, are always medi-
ated through language, and language is open to interpretation.
As noted above, this does not mean that there is no such thing
as truth or facts, or even that objectivity cannot be seen as an
ideal. It does mean, however, that our knowledge of facts or
truth is always in some way filtered. Thus, to recognize that a
narrative underpins an argument helps us to negotiate the me-
diated nature of all attempts to get at "truth".
C. Stories as Critiques
The contention that a communication that does not look like
a story-an article, a statement of legal rules or policies-is
nonetheless (just) a story is usually offered as a criticism. But
the foundationalist and anti-foundationalist challenges actually
involve quite distinguishable critiques directed to quite different
ends. The foundationalist challenge seeks to get things right in
an absolute sense, so when a foundationalist argues that an op-
ponent's position is just a story, she tends to mean that her op-
ponent is telling the wrong story, and her objective is to correct
it. But the antifoundationalist challenge denies the possibility of
a single right story, so when she argues that her opponent's po-
sition is just a story, her goal is not to correct it, but to demon-
strate its character as a social or cultural artifact that could be
constructed differently. Some examples can help demonstrate
these points.
cannot and should not question those frameworks. The question is not whether we do
rely on frameworks, categories, and the like, but whether we treat those frameworks
and categories as "natural" or, in contrast, are willing to examine the beliefs and as-
sumptions that underlie them. See Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Los-
ing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 47, 51-53 (1988) (feminists must rely on and yet challenge sim-
plifying categories and stereotypes).
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Imagine two scholars debating whether the basis of contract
obligation lies in free choice (simplistically: the state in enforc-
ing contracts implements the intention of private citizens to be
bound) or in reliance (the state in enforcing contracts imposes
obligations on private citizens to prevent unfairness and protect
reliance, regardless of the citizens' intention to be bound).11
These two positions about contract law can be cast as stories:
the intention story (in which people go around making free and
unfettered trades) and the reliance story (in which people first
induce, and then betray, trust). What is accomplished by recast-
ing the positions as stories?
The label "story" in this context is meant to be belittling,
dismissive: the intent argument, sneers the believer in reliance,
is just a story (translate: a fantasy, a fiction), whereas the reli-
ance argument is not (translate: is correct, accurate, true). And
when the intent proponent rejoins that it is the reliance rather
than the intention argument that is the story (i.e., fantasy, fic-
tion), he is making the legal analogue of the statement, "Is not!"
Substantively, the assertion that the intent argument is just a
story implies that it does not "fit the facts"; such assertions tend
to be followed by analyses of the case law demonstrating that
holdings cannot be explained by reference to intent, but can be
better (or only) explained with reference to reliance. The argu-
ment, in other words, is basically over how best to understand
contract law in light of the facts of human behavior and prior
case law. In this argument, it is assumed that the proper mea-
sure of "best" is fit with facts or law. Foundationalist challenges
in this sense take for granted and rely on traditional criteria for
evaluating legal arguments.
The relatively traditional nature of the foundationalist chal-
lenge is at times obscured by the form in which that challenge
is offered. Rather than employing the traditional "article" for-
mat, some legal scholars have published stories to supplement
or even to supplant conventional analysis.19 Instead of arguing
118. These theories are but two of many that have been offered to explain the basis
of contract. For overviews of the theories, see RANDY E. BAINE'r, CoNMACTS: CASES AND
Doc'nRNz 631-54 (1995); A CoNTRAcTs ANTHOLOGY 54-128 (Peter Linzer ed., 2d ed. 1995).
For one recent argument that none of the accepted theories adequately explains contract
law, see James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REv. 547, 548 (1995) ("Theo deci-
sions [of American courts] do not turn on whether the parties made a bargain or the
promisee relied or the offeree assented. They turn on the effect of the transaction on the
distribution of wealth between the parties.").
119. See, eg., Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on
"Reproduction" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. Rav. 355 (1989) (using the author's own exper-
iences of childbirth and miscarriage as a basis for criticizing the law's treatment of is-
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about what the cases "really" show about the relative impor-
tance of intention or reliance in contract law, scholars in this
vein describe their own or others' actual experiences in entering
into or enforcing contracts. 20 The stories are often quite dra-
matic and surprising, but their apparently radical departure
from the formal conventions of legal scholarship can cloud a rel-
atively accepted substantive goal: to demonstrate some aspect of
lived reality that existing legal doctrine fails to take into ac-
count. In other words, stories presented as part of a foundation-
alist challenge are offered for their "informational value."'12 Un-
derlying these presentations is the very ordinary, not
earthshaking, presumption that legal doctrine should be based
on and responsive to facts; under this presumption, if there are
facts that doctrine leaves out of account, reality to which doc-
trine does not respond, then there is a problem with the law.
The critique implicit in foundationalist storytelling is reformist
in orientation.
But imagine a slightly different version of the debate be-
tween the two contracts scholars. One argues that contract law
is primarily based on the intent of the parties. The other re-
sponds that this view is "(just) a story." If the first professor
were then to ask, "Oh. Do you think that reliance better ex-
plains the cases?," the second might reply, "No. Reliance is (just)
a story, too. The relational theory' 2 is yet another story, and I'd
say the same for any other theories offered to 'explain' contract
law." What does the label "story" mean here?
In this context, to call an account a story is not to contrast
it with some other real or ideal account that is not a story, i.e.,
that is "true". Rather, the critic calls an account a story to em-
phasize its nature as an explanatory construction. This is what
we attempted to do by narrativizing Toward Neutral Principles,
and the same could be done for a traditional essay on contract
sues surrounding reproduction); Eskridge, supra note 17 (using the author's and others
stories as the basis for a critique of homophobia in the law); Estrich, supra note 5 (using'
the story of the author's own rape to introduce an evaluation of rape doctrine); Martha
R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90
MIcE. L. REv. 1 (1991) (using stories of the experiences of battered women to explore
problems in the legal treatment of battering).
120. See, eg., PATRICIA J. WILIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTs 146-65
(1991).
121. Eskridge, supra note 17, at 614.
122. On the relational theory, see, for example, Ian R. Macneil, Adjustment of Long-
Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law,
72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Rela-
tional Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981).
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doctrine because the point of almost any presentation can be re-
written as the "moral" of a story.2 3 Other strategies are also
available for emphasizing the constructed nature of any individ-
ual account. One could, for example, illustrate how the courts in
each case carefully selected which "facts" about the transaction
to describe. Dealings between the parties prior to the legally-
effective offer where a particular opinion begins, for example,
might provide a context in which the transaction described by a
court could be perceived very differently.124 Or perhaps all the
cases in a given category involve plaintiffs in similar positions-
women, say, or children. Focusing on this aspect of these cases,
rather than on their formal holdings, might show that the appli-
cation of legal doctrine depends importantly on courts' percep-
tions not just about the parties but also about the groups or cat-
egories to which those individuals belong. 25 Yet a third strategy
is to tell one--or better yet-several stories that interrogate the
original account, showing how the same event/transaction might
be very differently perceived by different actors, so that no sin-
gle version of either "what happened" or "the meaning of events"
can be arrived at. 6
The object of these efforts is not to establish some alterna-
tive, authoritative account of the law in question. Rather, it is to
emphasize the impossibility of establishing an authoritative ac-
count. To say that the original account, be it Wechsler's view of
constitutional decision-making or the reliance theory of contract,
is (just a) story is thus not in itself a critique, for the multiplic-
ity of ways in which a single event might be perceived and de-
scribed suggests that all alternative accounts will equally be
(just) stories. The critique lies in the demonstration of how the
original account seeks falsely to establish itself as authoritative,
123. See, eg., Wayne Eastman, How Coasean Bargaining Entails a Prisoners' Di-
lemma, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 89, 89 (1996) (describing as "stories" both the Coase
Theorem and the Prisoners' Dilemma); Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the
Beach Access Movements of the 1970's in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property
and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REv. 719 (1996) (describing the "stories" organizing com-
peting theories of beach access law).
124. See Scheppele, Foreword, supra note 3, at 2094-97 (describing how starting a
story at a different point in time changes perceptions of the events "in question"). See
also Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAw's STORMs, supra note 2, at 24, 31 (describing
problems of selectivity in storytelling, important parts of a story may be omitted in order
to present the actors in a more sympathetic or unsympathetic light).
125. See, eg., Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Con-
tracts Casebook, 34 Am U. L. REv. 1065, 1129-34 (1985); Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing
Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FL ST. U. L. REV. 195, 216-17 (1987).




to privilege itself as the only "true" account. This privileging re-
quires the suppression or subordination of other perspectives. 7
What passes for "analysis" can thus be understood as the exer-
cise of domination and power. Wechsler recounts the history of
Brown as a narrative about the legitimacy of judicial decision-
making, but this is "only a story" in the sense that there are
many other enlightening narratives that could frame Brown.
The author in Wechsler's position (generically, the "original
author") might well complain that he did not mean to tell a
story but rather to make a case or tell the truth, and that the
story presented in the narrativized version of the article there-
fore is not his. The complaint is well-founded: the re-writing of
the article (or speech or rule) into a story is meant to expose
and, usually, to challenge the original author's epistemological
assumptions. The fact that a different article/story can be writ-
ten out of the same materials the original author used to con-
struct the article/story he wrote only demonstrates the extent to
which meaning is a function of perspective and of language.
From inside the foundationalist premises of conventional legal
analysis, reading Toward Neutral Principles as a narrative mis-
represents it because it presents the article's thesis as but one
of many possible visions of how constitutional decision-making
can be justified, whereas the article proceeds from the view that
some understandings of constitutional decision-making are bet-
ter than others (even if we can't agree which are better). But
from the antifoundationalist perspective, in which the notion of
"better" makes only relative sense, the charge of misrepresenta-
tion has no critical bite; that charge proves only that people who
believe truth is univocal and objective will perceive as mistaken
those who suggest that truth is multiple and perspectival.
127. See Delgado, supra note 8, at 553:
There is the maoritarian" story or tale. White folks tell stories, too. But they
don't seem like stories at all, just the truth. So when one of them tells a story,
such as the pool is so small or affirmative action ends up stigmatizing and dis-
advantaging able blacks, few consider whether it is authentic, typical, or true.
No one asks whether it is adequately tied to legal doctrine, because it and
others like it are the very bases by which we evaluate legal doctrine. White
tales like these seem unimpeachable.
(footnote omitted).
128. For a discussion of analogous misreadings and misrepresentations of judicial
opinions, see Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reex-




D. Stories as Scholarship
We have been sketching a general theory concerning the
place of narrative in legal scholarship, and thus we are now in a
position to understand better the debate about storytelling in le-
gal scholarship. 129 A great deal of that debate turns on the
choice between the vantage of foundationalism as opposed to
that of antifoundationalism. From the former, it is reasonable to
ask questions on the order of: Is this story true? Is it typical? Is
it relevant? From the vantage of antifoundationalism, more im-
portant questions would be: Where does this story start? What
does it take for granted? How does it seek to establish itself as
authoritative? How does it seek to defuse alternative interpreta-
tions? What are its political and historical contexts? The differ-
ence between these sets of questions to some extent problema-
tizes the notion of "standards" for (good) scholarship.
Assessments of whether scholarship is "better" or "worse" must
be made at least in part in terms of success in achieving objec-
tives, but foundationalist and antifoundationalist objectives are,
to state the obvious, quite divergent.
Scholarship in the overt form of a story ("narrative scholar-
ship") does not look like scholarship in the form that articles
have usually taken. But (some) foundationalist narrative schol-
arship shares objectives with articles more typical in form
("classical scholarship"): to show readers something new and im-
portant about the relationship of facts and law in the world. If
one believes, for example, that antidiscrimination law should
reach all conduct that minorities experience as hurtful, then it
would be a reasonable aim of scholarship about antidiscrimina-
tion law to adduce evidence of such hurtful conduct not reached
by existing law. That evidence is offered in traditional scholar-
ship in a variety of ways. There may be a bald assertion of ac-
tual fact-"much conduct not currently reached by the law actu-
ally hurts minorities"-with accompanying citation of
129. See, eg., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An
Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993) (criticizing narrative scholar-
ship); Baron, supra note 30; Eskridge, supra note 17; Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibil-
ity, and Pre-Understanding: A Defense of Outsider Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82
GEo. L.J. 1845 (1994) (all responding to the Farber and Sherry critique); Mark Tushnet,
The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 G.o. L.J. 251 (1992) (criticizing narra-
tive scholarship); Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. L.J.
313 (1992) (responding to the Tushnet critique). See also Coughlin, supra note 8 (criticiz-
ing autobiographical narrative scholarship) and sources cited infra note 133 (responding
to the Coughlin critique).
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authority.130 Or there may be a more tentative assertion of hypo-
thetical fact--one can imagine minorities being hurt by much
conduct that the law does not currently reach"--with accompa-
nying illustration of a particular kind of conduct that some indi-
viduals might find hurtful. Some narrative scholarship simply
offers evidence of how the law fails to reach hurtful conduct in
the form of a story about someone's experience of that particular
conduct.131 The objective of the story is the same as the objective
of the assertions in classical scholarship: to provide evidence of
an important fact.
To the extent that a story's purpose is evidentiary in the
sense we just described, it can be interrogated like any other
item of evidence. Not all evidence is equally good, thus it is fair
to ask of these "evidentiary" stories whether they are actually
good evidence of whatever they purport to show.
Notice, however, that this inquiry does not necessarily re-
quire that a story be true (as opposed to fictional) or typical (as
opposed to unusual). William Faulkner's depictions of the work-
ings of racism in novels such as Absalom, Absalom or Go Down
Moses are unquestionably fictional and involve most peculiar
events, yet they provide excellent evidence of the harms of slav-
ery in the antebellum South. Martha Nussbaum has recently il-
lustrated that the fictional Mr. Gradgrind of Charles Dickens'
Hard Times provides evidence of the moral perils of certain
130. An interesting question here is what counts as authority. Survey evidence? Ac-
counts in books or the press of minorities' experiences? The conventions of classical
scholarship virtually demand that assertions of empirical facts be "backed up" by some-
thing- however many quibbles there might be over the strength of cited authorities, the
quoted words appearing without a supporting citation would invite a full-scale attack.
Accusations about the inappropriateness of stories often arise because, it is alleged, the
"anecdotal" is neither verifiable nor generalizable. Stories cannot be independently re-
peated in the lab in order to reproduce their findings. For an elaboration of this point,
see Farber & Sherry, supra note 129, at 835-40.
131. See, eg., WILLIAMs, supra note 120, passim; Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece:
Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365. See also
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 139; Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judi-
cial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the
Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1749 (1990) (describing how judicial stories
of the experience of discrimination may be at odds with litigants' actual experiences).
For an article in story form that describes how a plaintiff who has suffered a civil
rights injury can find "that it is very hard to tell [his or her] story in court," see Richard
Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84 CAL. L. REv. 61,
81 (1996). Delgado reaches the depressing conclusion that "there is something funda-
mentally wrong with the legal narrative: one simply cannot tell stories of many kinds of
injustice through the law." Id. at 88-89.
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forms of utilitarian thinking.132 Fiction can show much that is
true about the world, so if we are in search of the "fact of the
matter" there is no reason to dismiss a story solely because we
know that the events it describes did not actually occur. In for-
mulating a legal approach it may be desirable to supplement a
fictional or hypothetical account with other forms of evidence,
such as retellings of actual events, the results of scientific exper-
iments, or the like. But this is no different from the need to sup-
plement what can be dry statistical compilations with other
forms of evidence, such as humanizing stories-actual or
imagined-that bring the numbers to life. We do not dismiss
statistics as evidence because they are sometimes unreliable or
inaccessible, and we need not dismiss stories on these grounds
either. Reliability, accessibility, relevance, persuasiveness all go
to the quality of the evidence, not to whether something can be
evidence.
Still, nothing guarantees that a story-fictional or real-
will be the best or even good evidence of whatever it purports to
show. Where narrative scholarship is offered for evidentiary pur-
poses, it will be evaluated for its quality, for no evidence is re-
ceived without scrutiny. To the extent that stories are offered to
demonstrate something true about the world, it is reasonable to
ask whether the demonstration works. This question will seem
harsh and ad hominem in the case of first-person accounts that
present themselves as true, as exemplified by the critiques of
Patricia Williams' Benetton story.133 But the question makes
sense in terms of these stories' objectives.
However, not all stories are offered for evidentiary purposes.
Narrative scholarship can be written from the vantage of an-
tifoundationalism. Such scholarship questions whether there can
be a single "fact of the matter." That question does not have to
be raised in story form; plenty of articles that look nothing like
stories have raised it.'13 But one way to explore the problems
and possibilities of the notion of a single fact of the matter is to
tell a story illustrating that what seemed to be an objective,
132. NUSSBAUM, supra note 13, at 13-52.
133. See RcHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw (1995); Farber & Sherry, supra note
124, at 835 n.146; Tushnet, supra note 129, at 266-71. See also Jerome McCristal Culp,
Jr., Telling a Black Story: Privilege, Authenticity, "Blunders," and Transformation in Out-
sider Narratives, 82 VA. L. REv. 69 (1996); Richard Delgado, Coughlin's Complaint: How
to Disparage Outsider Writing, One Year Later, 82 VA. L. REv. 95 (1996) (responding to
apparently ad hominem attacks in Coughlin, supra note 8).
134. See, eg., Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/FeminismlLaw, 77 CORNELL L. REV.




neutral and correct account looked or could have looked, from an
alternative perspective, biased, partial or nonsensical. The objec-
tive of such narrative scholarship, like the objective of nonnarra-
tive antifoundationalist scholarship, is not to prove any particu-
lar version of the facts to be false. Rather it is to problematize
the idea of "knowing" the facts.13 5
Note that here again the distinction between true and fic-
tional stories is not itself helpful for evaluating narrative schol-
arship written from an antifoundationalist vantage point. A fic-
tional tale, or a series of fictional stories "telling" the same
event from multiple perspectives, as in Faulkner's As I Lay Dy-
ing or Akira Kurasawa's film Rashomon,136 may be quite suc-
cessful in calling into question the notion of a single univocal
"truth." The appropriate question is not whether these stories
recount events that actually happened, but whether, singly or
alone, they create doubts about what is or can be known.
Rashomon's manipulation of points of view and of audience
trust exemplifies the way in which multiple perspectives compli-
cate the idea of truth. Each participant in or observer of the
film's core event holds a different stake in the way that event is
read. The film raises questions about who gets to narrate the
story, who gets to hear it, and who gets to interpret it. One of
the several internal frames in the film aligns the viewer with
the royal magistrate in the interrogation yard where the central
narrations take place. The viewer never sees the final arbiter of
the "truth"; the judgmental voice is strategically occluded, in-
deed never heard. The film ends as it begins, at the liminal
space of the city gates, neither inside nor outside. The horror it
bespeaks is the possibility that the "truth" will never out at all,
precisely because it can never be known.
Again, nothing guarantees that any particular story or set
of stories will create doubts about what can be known. As Pat-
rick Ewick and Susan Silbey have explained:
[Narratives] are cultural productions. Narratives are generated interac-
tively through normatively structured performances and interactions[.]
Because of the conventionalized character of narrative .... our stories
135. As we noted earlier, the antifoundationalist does not deny the existence of facts
in the world. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17. The question is whether there
is any transparent, unmediated means by which we can perceive or know those facts.
136. Kurasawa's film is based on two short stories by Ryunosuko Akutagawa (1892-
1927) called Rashomon and In a Grove. See RYuNosuKo AKUTAGAWA, RASHOMON AND
OTHER STORIEs (Takashi Kojima trans., 1952). We should note that the original stories do
not employ multiple perspectives. Discussions of the film, the screenplay, and the origi-
nal stories can be found in Focus oN RASHOMON (Donald Ritchie ed., 1972).
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are likely to express ideological effects and hegemonic assumptions. We
are as likely to be shackled by the stories we tell (or that are culturally
available for our telling) as we are by the form of oppression they might
seek to reveal.u37
Notwithstanding some of the more exaggerated claims that
have been made on behalf of storytelling, it is not the case that
a story will cause a rethinking of assumptions or a recognition
of perspectivism merely because it is a story.138 Some stories
may be "subversive" and "liberatory"' 39; others may-advertently
or inadvertently-reinforce the status quo.14° To the extent that
137. Patrick Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: b.
ward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 L & SocY REv. 197, 211-12 (1995). See also Coughlin,
supra note 8, at 1257:
Just as legal doctrine determines the facts that judges will find, so the conven-
tions, practices, and concerns of the law and the academy furnish the space for
debate and perhaps even produce the truth that outsider stories report by de-
termining which events are significant (or real) enough to be represented. This
is one of a variety of ways ... in which the narrative form distinctly mitigates
the subversive intention of outsider storytelling.
138. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 385 ("When we tell law stories.... we may be
merely reproducing the conventional narrative, with its implicit, existing norms....
Narrative ... is a tool that can be used either to perpetuate the status quo, or to chal-
lenge it to move the law forward.") See also id. at 393 (arguing that victim impact state-
ments, in particular, "illustrate that storytelling can be used for distinctly unprogressive
ends.").
139. Ewick & Silbey, supra note 137, at 222-23.
140. There is no consensus on what makes a story subversive. Ewick & Silbey's
view is as follows:
[T]o the degree that stories depict understandings about particular persons
and events while simultaneously effacing the connections between the particu-
lar persons and the social organization of their experience, they hide the
grounds of their own plausibility and thus help reproduce the taken-for-
granted hegemony. However, narratives can also be subversive. To the degree
that stories make visible and explicit the connections between particular lives
and social organization, they may be liberatory.
Id. at 222-23.
Richard Sherwin offers, a different view:
Lawyers and legal scholars can learn to assess more candidly their
own and others' meaningmaking habits. This includes evaluating
omissions, inconsistencies, and plotlines that flow from deep (usually
hidden) beliefs and assumptions about what truth and justice are and
how they operate in the world. These beliefs in turn often stem from
subconsciously assimilated story forms, myths, and popular images. If
this is so, we need to recognize and assess the effect of these in-
grained preferences on how we tell stories as well as on how we hear
them, being particularly alert to the exploitation of instinctive prefer-
ences for narrative techniques like causal linearity, story closure, and
tantalizing scripts and stereotypes.
Richard Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal
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narrative scholarship aims to raise questions about what is usu-
ally taken for granted, or to create insight about the inevitably
partial (incomplete, biased) nature of any particular point of
view, stories of the latter sort may reasonably be deemed
unsuccessful.
All of this is to say that antifoundationalist narrative schol-
arship and foundationalist narrative scholarship must alike be
evaluated in terms of their objectives. 41 Foundationalists want
to demonstrate the potential fixedness of facts; anti-foundation-
alists attempt to show that the very notion of unmediated factu-
ality is itself problematic. Since the objectives are divergent, so
must the evaluative criteria diverge. Success at illustrating
something hitherto unseen about the world differs from success
at illustrating that all seeing is partial: seeing some things pre-
vents seeing others.
Two factors have obscured this relatively obvious point.
First, storytellers sometimes try to have it both the foundation-
alist and antifoundationalist ways, offering stories of exper-
iences that, they say, "truly" occurred while simultaneously
questioning the notion of truth.142 While there are ways to ex-
plain and possibly dissolve this apparent paradox, 143 the surface
ambiguity renders it easy to misunderstand the storytellers'
epistemological claims. In some cases, then, it has not been clear
what evaluative criteria are appropriate.
The second factor that has led to confusion over standards
is controversy about antifoundationalism itself. Many have
found both narrative and nonnarrative challenges to the notion
of a single, objectively knowable truth about events in the world
Case, 47 STA. L. REv. 39, 81-82 (1994).
141. For suggestions to this effect made in the context of narrative scholarship par-
ticularly, see Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL L. REv. 971 (1991);
Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. CoLo. L REv. 683
(1992). See also Philip C. Kissam, The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L. REV.
221 (1988) (suggesting that all scholarship must be evaluated in terms of its purposes);
Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL.
L. REv. 889, 902 (1992) ('To judge a particular work, then, we need to know what schol-
ars in the field are attempting to achieve.").
To argue that scholarship should be evaluated in terms of its objectives is not to ar-
gue that scholarship should not be evaluated at all. For arguments that evaluation of
narrative scholarship might best be postponed, see Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn
in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WML & MARY L REV. 741, 766 (1993); Richard Delgado, On
Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VANM. L. REV. 665, 676
(1993).
142. See Baron, supra note 30, at 282-85; Angela Harris, Foreword: The Jurispru-
dence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL L. REv. 741, 757 (1995).
143. See Baron, supra note 30, at 283-84.
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to be unpersuasive, incoherent, or even dangerous. 144 To these (it
is not clear whether to deem them doubters or believers), the
premises of stories written from the antifoundationalist vantage
point are simply wrong. Having rejected the stories' objectives, it
is not surprising that they judge the stories to be failures. But
this judgment involves a dispute not about standards but about
objectives.145
I1. LAw, NARRATIVES, AND FACTS
Finding the facts has a cherished place in law. Legislative
policy is based in part on facts gathered by staff and adduced at
hearings, although "politics" may also play a role. Lawyers nego-
tiate deals and settlements based on facts their clients have
communicated. At trials, juries or judges must find the facts in
order to render a verdict in a lawsuit.
These images may seem too simple, but it would be troub-
ling if they were only idealizations. As skeptics about the law
and literature movement have been quick to recognize, legal de-
cisions have consequences different from those of debates over,
say, the best interpretation of Hamlet.146 The image usually
proffered to evoke these consequences is the convicted defendant
in chains, being led to prison or execution,147 but plenty of less
dramatic instances could be offered to make the same point:
property settlements on divorce have enormous impact on the
relative well-being of family members once they come to live
apart;'4 evictions from public housing projects for involvement
144. See Sherry, supra note 19, at 484:
The Enlightenment was indeed aptly named. From the darkness that hid anti-
Semitism and other forms of religious persecution, the denial of human free-
dom for the sake of protecting orthodoxy, the inadvertent cruelty of a nature
that man could neither comprehend nor tame, and the deliberate unspeakable
tortures committed by one religious regime after another, the Enlightenment
burst forth and pointed us toward freedom and equality. We have not yet at-
tained either, but we should be careful before jettisoning the world view that
has brought us this far. The dangers that the epistemology of the Enlighten-
ment gradually defeated remain very real ....
145. For a general approach to the problem of assessing the quality of scholarship
proceeding from premises that the evaluator does not share, see Rubin, supra note 141,
at 947-53.
146. See Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in Law, in LAVs STORIES, supra note
2, at 2, 4 ("Of course, there are fundamental differences between law and literature;
most obviously, law coerces people.").
147. See Cover, supra note 10, at 1618-28.
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in drug trade can lead to homelessness;149 rules barring adoption
by a second parent who is the same sex as the first may deprive
some children of care or inheritance rights.150 Legal decisions, in
other words, have consequences for the people affected by them.
These consequences, especially when they are negative or pain-
ful, cry out for justification.
Facts have traditionally been part of the processes that jus-
tify and legitimate legal decisions. The prisoner in chains is in
that position because the judge or the jury found as a fact that
he was guilty of the crime charged. If he did not in fact commit
the crime, his punishment is unjust. So is the homelessness of
the wrongly evicted tenant, the disinheritance of the child who
could not be adopted.
What if there were biases or distortions that systematically
prevented legal decision-makers from correctly finding the facts?
What if the phenomena that had been thought of as facts were
just projections of a decision-maker's own individual values and
prejudices? What if the empirical and scientific conventions that
have been used in the past to generate and assess facts were
themselves shown to lack objectivity and to be animated by a
particular and non-neutral point of view? What if there is no
agreement on the criteria that should be used to decide whether
something is a "fact"? These questions substantially complicate
the basic idea of justice as based on, or responsive to, facts.
Questions such as these are precisely the questions that le-
gal storytellers have tried to raise. Stories that point out some
important fact about an experience that has been wrongly ig-
nored or left out of account suggest that the factual universe on
which legal decisions are based can be too narrow. Stories that
point out feelings, events or experiences at odds with those on
which a particular doctrine is predicated suggest that sometimes
the law is based on an incomplete or even wrong understanding,
of the facts. Stories that illustrate some of the many things that
could not be shown at a trial suggest that evidentiary rules may
impede, not facilitate, discovery of the facts. 151 Stories that
149. See U.S. v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015
(E.D.N.Y. 1991).
150. See Maxwell S. Peltz, Second-Parent Adoptions: Overcoming Barriers to Lesbian
Family Rights, 2 MlcH J. GENDER & L 175 (1995); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does
Have Two Mothers, 78 GEo. L.J. 459 (1990).
151. See Robert A. Ferguson, Untold Stories in the Law, in LAWs STORIES, supra
note 2, at 84, 96:
What... happens when a relevant story is actively repressed in a republic of
laws? The simple answer would seem to be that it always returns, but on what
terms? Whose terms? .... [Wihen such a story is actively repressed in a forum
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demonstrate how a single event could be perceived differently by
the various actors involved suggest that there is no single
description that will be universally recognized as the facts.152
Factual errors or omissions can be corrected; evidentiary
rules, like other legal doctrines, can be reformed. But the story-
tellers' questions are not easy to dismiss. Foundationalist stories
suggest that the law gets "the facts" wrong as often as it gets
them right. If these errors tend to pertain to particular kinds of
facts-facts about outsiders, facts about power-it is difficult to
believe they will be "reformed" away. And antifoundationalist
questions are meant to challenge the very idea of pure factual-
ity-a challenge that, if taken seriously, would require a re-
thinking of basic notions of just decision-making. 153 Courts, after
all, still have to decide cases;154 if (to recur to our earlier exam-
ple) all contract theories are (just) stories, how should a court
adjudicate a dispute between two parties to a sales agreement?
Just as the notion of finding the facts has a cherished place
in law, the notion of getting at the truth has a cherished place
in legal scholarship. This is obviously not the place to debate
what legal scholarship should try to accomplish, or whether any-
one-especially anyone in the judiciary-is actually listening to
what legal scholars say. 55 But for many scholars, as for Herbert
Wechsler, the general purpose of scholarship is simple: to tell
that prides itself on its thoroughness and fairness, it belongs to the agent of
the repressed.
152. To return to Rashomon, one interpretation is that all the characters' stories are
true. Each character simply narrates his or her particular experience of what happened.
These accounts will all be 'partial" in one of two possible senses: (1) each account might
be biased by the character's personality, disposition, attitudes and assumptions, or (2)
each account may be incomplete, based on the fragmentary knowledge available to each
person. On the ambiguity of the notion of partiality, see Jane B. Baron, The Many
Promises of Storytelling in Law, 23 RuTGERs L.J. 79, 83 & n.23 (1991) (book review).
153. For a thoughtful essay on the problematic quality even of the most apparently
factual of all narratives, the voluntary confession, see Peter Brooks, Storytelling Without
Fear? Confession in Law and Literature, in LAw's SToRMs, supra note 2, at 114.
154. It is this situation that has led some to question the utility of
antifoundationalism.
Lies are the ultimate risk of storytelling as method. This may be embarrass-
ingly non-postmodern, but reality exists. Of this the law, at least, has no
doubt. Something happened or will be found to have happened. You can still be
tried for peijury even though there supposedly is no truth. You can still be
sued for libel, so somewhere reality exists to be falsified.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Law's Stories as Reality and Politics, in LAW'S STORIEs, supra
note 2, at 232, 235.
155. In addition to the sources cited supra note 141, see generally A Symposium on
Legal Scholarship, 63 U. CoLO. L REv. 521 (1992); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Dis-
junction Between Legal Education and Legal Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. Rav. 34 (1992).
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the truth about what the law is and should be. To the extent
that legal storytellers complicate the notion of "truth," they
raise questions about just what it is that scholars can and
should do.
CONCLUSION
This essay is, of course, its own Russian doll. After analyz-
ing the narrative structure of Toward Neutral Principles, we go
on to produce an antifoundationalist way of looking at stories
that, if accepted, makes a theory of neutral principles an impos-
sible paradigm. One cannot analyze the structure of something
without taking a position on that something. It would be com-
pletely specious to compliment Wechsler's rhetoric without com-
menting on his thesis, because form and content are not, in fact,
separable.
We claim that an antifoundationalist practice precludes the
possibility of absolute neutrality, even though neutrality might
still serve as an ideal. In addition, we make several other claims
in this article, each of which might be narrativized. We believe
that legal thinking and literary criticism can learn from one an-
other in mutually beneficial ways. We believe that the legal
storytelling movement has pointed jurisprudence in a good di-
rection, but that the theoretical underpinnings of legal story-
telling have not yet been adequately formulated. We hope Is
Law Narrative? moves the relationship between storytelling and
the law in this direction by making a stronger case for the im-
portance of such a relationship than has heretofore been made.
And finally, we suggest that lawyers, judges, and legal scholars
would do well to learn the techniques of close reading- and liter-
ary analysis.
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